Legal Aspects of the Boycott

This is the sixth of a series of article by Mr. Chaitkin, well known New York attorney, on the legal effects of the anti-Nazi boycott in the United States and else-where

The zeal with which the Nazis outside the Reich’s borders apply themselves to the display of the swastika is in curious contrast with their diffidence in exposing their country’s name on their wares. We hear of the hooked cross descrating synagogue walls in Eastern Europe, of near-riots it has provoked at public meetings in England, of the German ambasador’s refusal to speak at Germantown, Philadelphia, because the display of thetribal totem is denied him. And yet we discover (by visiting our favorite Jewishowned department store):

That those gloves on the bargain counters have the. word “Germany” in faint letters hiding sheepishly in the inner depths, coming to light only when we turn the fingers inside out. That the black lacquered cigarette box which we so trustingly ordered delivered to our non-Aryan home, actually requires inspection by means of a magnifying glass before it reluctantly yields the secret of its origin. The tiny word “Germany” is so cunningly embossed in the metal as possibly to be felt by the sense of touch, but never, never to be gazed upon by the naked eye.

And as if this modesty were not enough, we find the German exporters exhibiting another trait unique in the totalitarium tate a seditious separatism, a love of the locality where the goods were made, a tenderness for the old states whien the Leader has wiped out with a single word. Instead of proudly proclaiming the name of awakened Germany (which had once been defiled by its association with suen names as Mendelssohn and Heine and Rathenau and Einstein but now, thank Wotan, has been sterilized by the exclusive patented Barb-Aryan Grandmother process), the toys bags and dishes persistently refer to the hunting old names of Sax. only. Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, and the Rhineland…

CLEAR AND CONSPICUOUS LABELS

How are these masquerading devices regarded in the eyes of the law?

The Tariff Act does not mince words:

“Every article imported into the United States, and its immediate container, and the package in which such article is imported, shall be marked, stamped, branded, or labeled, in legible English words, in a conspicuous place, in such manner as to indicate the country of origin of such article * * *. Such marking, stamping, branding, or labeling shall be as nearly indelible and permanent as the nature of the article will permit * * * (Tariff Act June 17, 1930, Sev. 304).

“Legible.” “consqicuous,” “indelible,” “permanent” – such are the legal requirements of the telltale mark of origin. If the customs anthorities discover any merchandise insufficiently or improperly marked, they are not permitted to release it from their custoday. If the violation is discovered after the goods are released, the importer must pay an additional duty of ten percent on the appraised value. Whoever in tentionally tampers with the mark is guilty of an offense punishable ..y a fine of $5,000. imprisonment of one year, or both.

It is apparent that the requirement as to legibility of the labeling has teeth in it. Nor is efficient legal machinery lacking to set the law in motion. Hard-working inspectors are attached to the office of each customs district, and any ovilence uncovered by them is turned over to the law division of the Collector of Customs for appropriate action. Complaints as violations of the labeling laws are handled courteously and promptly, and are especiall welcome in these days when the revenue derived from the additional tariff duty would help balance emergency relief expenditures. The sole explanation for the widespread violations and evasions of the labeling law, with respect to the requirements of conspicuous legibility, is the inertia and apathy of the consuming public, and the lack of a central boycotting organization for the investigation and handling of all complaints of this nature.

The law is less clear as to whether labeling a product “made in Wurttemberg.” “made in Saxony.” etc., is legitimate. The expression used in the Tariff Act is that the label shall indicate the country of origin. The Act further provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe the detailed rules and regulations under which the Act is to be enforeed. Now the Treasury Department has always taken the position that “indicate” is not synonymous with “designate” or “name” or “state.” Under its regulations, a Swedish article may be stampet “made in Stockholm” (if this be the fact); a Czecho-Slovakian article “made in Bohemia”; any Canadian article-with the name of the Province where the article originated. With respect to German goods, the Treasury regulations specifically permit the use of the names “Baden.” “Bavaria,” “Prussia,” “Rhineland,” “Saxony,” and “Wurttemberg,” as sufficiently “indectating the country of origin” (see Customs Regulations, Article 509, 1931 Ed. and amsndments).

There is a serious doubt as to the soundness of the Treasury rulings. It must be evident that there are millions who have never heard of Baden or Wurttemberg, or who do not know where Saxony is. To a great many people “Saxony” must sound like the name of an “Anglo-Saxon” country.

The Court of Customs Appeals the highest tribunal having jurisdiction oven customs disputes has frequently emphasized the importance of avoiding confusion in the minds of consumers with respect to the “country of origin.”

In American Burtonizing Co. U. S., 13 Court of Cust. App. p. 652, the Court held the word “Aisne,” the name of a Department of France, to be an insufficient indication of the country of origin. The language of the opinion is extremely significant:

“We do not think that Congress intended that American purchasers, consumers, or users of foreign-made goods should be required to speculate, investigate, or interpret in order that they might ascertain the country of origin.”

In a recent case a shipment of dates entered with the marking “Mesopotamia.” The Customs Court found on consulting the map that modern Mesopotamia was but a part of a larger country, Iraq. It held that the marking was improper because it appeared “that there is no modern sovereign country known as Mesopotamia”. . (Van Dyk & Reeves, T. D. Aug. 17, 1933).

The legality of the Customs regulations with reference to the Reich goods marked “Saxony,” “Bavaria,” etc., has not been squarely presented to the courts. It is quite possible that if evidence of actual confusion in the public mind were submitted, the present regulations would be invalidated. That such confusion exists and is deliberately fostered by unscrupulous dealers, is a well known fact.

It would also seem that with the “unification” of Germany and the abolition of states’ rights, which is hailed by the Nazi as an out-standing achievement of the Hitler government, it does not lie in their mouths to insist that they may still mark their goods with the names of the defunct states. The case is squarely within the language of the Customs Court decision in the Van Dyk case (“there is no modern sovereign country nown as Mesopotamia”).

There are of course, means other than court actions whereby the regulations could be amended or superseded. American competitors of the “Saxon” or “Wurt-tembergian” importers might well make direct representations to the Treasury Department and insist on an amendment of the rulings in the light of the changed facts. Failing to obtain relief, they might petition Congress to amend the appropriate sections of the Tariff Act so as to eliminate the word “indicate” and substitute “designate” in connection with the “country of origin” requirement.

The labeling provisions of the Tariff Act afford those interested in the anti-Nazi boycott their sole opportunity to lean on the strong arm of the federal goverment in stemming the infiux of Reich goods into this country. Moreover, these laws apply only to a portion of the total German imports. Crude materials, whether sold separately or as ingredients of finished products, need not be labeled. In addition, considerable quantities of German merchandise are purposely left unfinished in some minor detail, are transsphipped to any adjacent country where they receive the finishing touches, and thence enter the U. S. as the products of friendly, civilized Switzerland (or Holland or Denmark). It seems a pity that in those cases where disclosures of German origin is made compul sory by law, so little has been done to make law effective.

The next artlce-the final in this series-will deal with the anti-Nazi boycott from the view-point of international law