“I don’t know how you do it — but you’ve done it…” Premier Golda Meir told Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last Wednesday night as the world looked on through the television cameras. How the U.S. Secretary had brought about the Israeli-Syrian disengagement after 32 days of unprecedented intense personal shuttle diplomacy, and what the disengagement accord signifies for the future of the mideast — these are the two issues which the pundits in the region and throughout the world are now furiously analyzing.
At least part of the explanation of how Kissinger pulled off the well nigh impossible is to be found in repeated references made during the month of talks by Israel’s information Minister Shimon Peres to “the broad context of U.S. Israel relations.” Peres stressed that the Israeli cabinet in its many long and turbulent sessions when the points of the accord were hammered out, always sought to see the negotiations in this broader context. Apparently this broad outlook upon the talks was encouraged by the Secretary himself.
The very real and very vital bearing of the future of U.S.-Israel relations upon the immediate issues of disengagement with Syria applies on two levels.
First on the immediate level of the negotiations themselves, the final obstacle — that of Isreal’s fears of terrorist incursions destroying an accord with Syrian collusion — was overcome in the end by American assurances and undertakings. The texts of some of these have not been made public — but Israel insisted on the right — which Mrs. Meir exercised in the Knesset — to declare publicly the undertaking it had received from the U.S. to view terrorist infiltrations as a violation of the accord and to back Israel’s retaliatory or precautionary measures against them.
NIXON ADMINISTRATION PRESTIGE ON LINE
On the more general long-term level, Kissinger had invested an enormous amount of prestige into his, shuttling effort — an investment which grew as the shuttle extended in time. President Nixon looked to these talks to provide a much needed success for his administration.
The Israeli negotiators were acutely aware of this vested American interest in an accord — over and above the ongoing American interest in improving the U.S. position in the Mideast, at the Soviet’s expense, if possible. There was no pressure, not even a hint of pressure, from the Secretary. But the situation was clear to all sides.
Furthermore, still on the long-term level, the Israeli side was aware that a successful conclusion of the 32-day marathon of talks would mean a strengthening of its ties with its only real ally — the U.S. In concrete terms this would mean a steady and ensured flow of arms supplies and economic aid.
Mrs. Meir in her Knesset address admitted frankly that the consideration of U.S. views and interest had influenced the Israeli negotiators. “in our decision… there is also a response to the aims and needs of nations friendly to Israel and which are particularly interested in stability and pacification in our region,” she said. “I will not deny that our decisions…took account of the advice and the policy of the US…..” Against this backdrop Israel’s concessions must be seen and understood. By the end of the 32 days Israel had moved far from its original positions.
KISSINGER SEPARATED ISSUES
A lesser factor, though also important, in Kissinger’s ultimate success was his insistence from the outset — maintained against Israel’s objections — on removing the issue of the line of separation from all the other issues of the accord. He calculated, rightly as it turned out, that if he could get the parties to agree on the line they would not be able later to thwart the accord on any of the subsidiary questions, and would ultimately have to make the necessary concessions to reach a settlement.
For that reason he was willing to spend the first two weeks bickering — in the words of a high Israeli source — over the three hills around Kuneitra (from which Israel would not budge), and over several insignificant villages along the buffer line, many of which Israel eventually conceded. It was clear from the outset that Israel would be prepared to vacate the town of Kuneitra itself — under satisfactory security arrangements.
The future? Apart from the obvious short term prospect of quiet on the northern front, the accord opens the way to further negotiations at Geneva — especially between Israel, and Egypt. Egyptian President Sadat had felt after January that he could go no further so long as he was alone at having signed an agreement with the Israelis. Now the conference is expected to get under way again — assuming the smooth completion of the Golan disengagement by then.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
