When President Jimmy Carter left the White House in January 1981, Israel and Egypt had agreed on nearly all the details of a Palestinian autonomy arrangement based on the plan set out in the 1978 Camp David accords.
Four-and-a-half years hence, the opportunity remains, but hesitation to assert a more aggressive U.S. role is allowing it to slip away, leaving the Middle East more open than ever to the “terrible dangers of conflagration.”
So says Sol Linowitz about the peace process that the Camp David summit initiated and which he, as the President’s personal representative for the Middle East negotiations from November 1979 to January 1981, had a vital role in nudging toward the distant objective of a comprehensive peace that the accords envisaged.
Egypt and Israel had made it over 60 percent of the way toward agreement on the powers and responsibilities of the proposed self-governing authority for Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, Linowitz said last week in a luncheon address to the Women’s National Democratic Club.
He was repeating a theme from the Middle East chapter of his recently-published memoirs, in which he maintains that an autonomy agreement could have been achieved in 1981, “for the simplest of reasons — the leaders were Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.”
The two heads of state, Linowitz observed in his book, “The Making of a Public Man,” “knew and respected each other, and understood each other’s political bases, strengths and weaknesses.”
‘THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN’
It came as little surprise when, in his address last week, the man who for 14 grueling months worked at playing midwife for the plan conceived at Camp David which ultimately ceased to develop, persisted in calling the Camp David Process — as he does in his memoirs — “the only game in town.”
But his impromptu warning on the dangers of U.S. inaction in the face of an impending change of government in Israel, coupled with lavish praise for Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, went somewhat beyond the substance and tone of his book.
Whereas Linowitz’s account of Begin in the book is relatively sympathetic — he bases his belief that the autonomy talks could have succeeded on the fact that Begin and Sadat were the leaders — his vision of the prospects for peace under a new Likud government is bleak.
Prime Minister Shimon Peres has 10 more months in his post, under the national unity agreement worked out between his Labor Party and the Likud, Linowitz observed.
“He will be followed by Shamir of the Likud. The Likud Party, as we all know from the Begin experience, is far less flexible, far less forthcoming, far more apt to adopt a belligerent attitude rather than the kind of flexible, reasonable attitude that is being shown by Peres. Those ten months are critical, and we ought to know that, and we ought to act on it, and I think we need pressure to achieve it,” Linowitz said.
In Egypt, meanwhile, Linowitz saw signs for encouragement in spite of recent setbacks. The Egyptian government, he said, “has sought to normalize relations with Israel, in the face of strong, even fierce, reaction” at home and from former Arab allies.
Admittedly, relations have deteriorated under Mubarak, because of differences over the Lebanese war, Taba and other issues, and in Mubarak’s desire to reestablish Egypt’s ties with the Arab world. But Sadat’s successor, Linowitz maintained, “has shown willingness to become involved and to take leadership, and we (the U.S.) should quickly recognize this and endorse his efforts.”
He noted that Mubarak “continues to make clear that he intends fully to abide by the terms of the Israel-Egypt treaty,” and observed “how much more grim and threatening the situation would be in the Middle East” if the treaty did not exist.
Responding to a question on Mubarak, Linowitz lamented the attitude of the Reagan Administration: “We have not paid enough attention to him, have not encouraged him, have not let him know that he has our full support.”
DISAPPOINTED WITH JORDAN
On Jordan, the former envoy’s disappointment continued to come through, in spite of what he called in his book “some new promise of progress” offered by King Hussein in recent months. The success of the Camp David framework for peace had hinged on Hussein’s willingness to join negotiations along the lines set out in the accord, but the Jordanian monarch rejected that framework.
Linowitz said that Jordan and Saudi Arabia “have not been helpful,” in their rejection of the Camp David process, and he criticized Hussein’s insistence on an international conference with PLO participation in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
But Linowitz praised Hussein for his efforts to get Syrian President Hafez Assad’s endorsement for any initiatives he might decide to take. “If somehow Hussein can be encouraged to move forward with the knowledge that Syria would not oppose him, I think that this would give him added courage and added desire to try to take the next step,” Linowitz said in response to a question.
Meetings between Jordanian and Syrian officials last month resulted in an agreement that opposed direct and separate peace talks with Israel. The two regimes have long been at loggerheads, and Syria has been viewed as a potentially disruptive force in any Middle East talks, in part because it sees little prospect of regaining the Golan Heights captured by Israel in 1967 and annexed in 1981.
Linowitz said he felt that the U.S. has been wrong in the past “in acting as though Syria was beyond the pale,” and that if a basis for peace was found that was in Syria’s interest — presumably, including the return of the Golan Heights — “it will respect it.” On the situation of the Palestinians, Linowitz had as much criticism of Israel and the U.S. as he did of the Arab world for perpetuating their troubles. “One of the great tragedies of our time is what we’ve done to the Palestinian people,” Linowitz said. “We all ought to be ashamed, all of us — we in this part of the world, and they in that part of the world.”
Speaking to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency following his address, Linowitz said he was referring to the failure of the U.S. to play a leading role in the Middle East under the Reagan Administration.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
