What they’re saying about yesterday’s trilateral summit

Some reaction to yesterday’s trilateral summit:

• Benny Avni in the New York Post: "The Israelis feel they emerged victorious from yesterday’s much-anticipated trilateral meeting with the Palestinians and President Obama. You could tell, because they felt magnanimous enough to say they didn’t. … Entering a meeting with Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (a first), Obama chose not to repeat the US demand for a total Israeli "freeze" of building construction in the West Bank. Instead, he talked (another first) of Israeli progress in steps to "restrain" settlement activity. When Obama then called on all sides to resume negotiations — effectively abandoning his past demands — Netanyahu felt somewhat vindicated."
• Shmuel Rosner in The New Republic: "Israel should restrain itself from declaring victory just yet. True, Obama had to draw down his overeager demands from Israel. But it is also true that Netanyahu, not long ago, had to reverse his opposition to a two-state-solution and publicly declare that his goal is similar to the one espoused today by Obama. True, Abbas was dragged to the summit only days after insisting that he will not come to any meeting unless settlement construction is frozen first. But it is also true that Netanyahu, the head of the right-wing Likud Party, is one of the first Israeli prime ministers to agree to some form of settlement freeze."
• Jonathan Tobin in Commentary: "Far from being a formula for peace, Obama’s involvement and his hectoring of Israel may set in motion a chain of events that, like the failure of Bill Clinton’s Camp David summit, may instigate a new campaign of Palestinian violence. Photos such as the one taken today may nurture the illusion that Obama is helping to nudge the Middle East on its way to peace. But the price for such heightened expectations, in the absence of any real change of heart about the need for mutual recognition of Israel on the part of the Arab and Muslim worlds, may be terrible indeed.
• Aluf Benn in Haaretz: "Two major differences were apparent Tuesday between Obama’s summit and those hosted by his predecessor, George W. Bush (in Aqaba in 2003 and in Annapolis in 2007). The Bush administration put an emphasis on synchronizing statements and agreements between the two sides. As soon as the summits were over, the Israelis and Palestinians were sent on their way to hold talks on their own – with American supervisors. However, Obama does it differently. He read his statement as a command directed at the two sides, and not as a joint statement. The president is planning to lead active American mediation efforts, spearheaded by his Middle East envoy George Mitchell."
• Washington Post editorial page: "What Mr. Obama oversaw … was little more than a photo opportunity with the two leaders — who continue to disagree with each other and with the Obama administration over the terms of the talks. Officials said they still believe they can achieve the administration’s aims in the coming weeks. But the gap between their initial hopes for the U.N. meeting and what occurred is revealing about the difficulties Mr. Obama’s diplomacy is encountering — and the miscalculations the president and his team have made."
• Noah Pollak in Commentary: But now, bowing to political reality, it seems that Obama has given up his opening demand for a complete freeze and seeks only that Israel “restrain” settlement activity, which the Israelis appear willing to do. If this happens, the process will turn back on Fatah. Mahmoud Abbas will be forced to choose between rejecting the entire peace process on the absurd grounds that 100 percent of his demands weren’t met, or abandoning his maximalist position and being humiliated in front of Hamas. Either way, the peace process is becoming far more damaging to Abbas than it is to Bibi.
• Daniel Levy in Foreign Policy: "By holding Israel’s feet to the fire over settlements for a sustained period, America may actually have achieved a great deal in strategically advancing the two-state goal. The most significant effect may be this: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s preferred approach was to focus on interim issues and confidence-building measures (CBMs) and to avoid negotiating the core issues (territories, settlements, Jerusalem, etc.) on which his positions are the most unreasonable. In particular, Netanyahu has attempted to advance an economic peace agenda, with his supporters feverishly spinning the idea that the West Bank is becoming an economic paradise. The Obama team has staked out a clear position – items number 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the interim/CBM agenda are entitled "settlement freeze." They have been giving short shrift, including today, to the economic peace narrative (they acknowledge the desirability of progress on the economy and freedom of movement, and should even congratulate themselves that the partial progress made is mainly a result of the heat Israel feels on settlements). The result: The settlement freeze focus has made Netanyahu’s natural comfort zone — the interim/CBM world — a prohibitively uncomfortable place to inhabit. So paradoxically, it is Netanyahu who now feels compelled to embrace and prefer negotiations on permanent status end-game issues. That is no small achievement."