Focus on Issues Sighs of Relief

There must have been sighs of relief in Jerusalem when the Senate and House select committees ended 11 weeks of public hearings on the Iran/Contra affair Tuesday.

The 41 days of public testimony left little doubt that it was Israel that proposed to the Reagan Administration that it seek an opening to moderates in Iran and that Israel continued to push the Iranian initiative when the United States was wavering.

But on the one issue that could have seriously hurt Israel with Congress, there was no hard evidence that the Israeli government knew about or had anything to do with the diversion of profits from the arms sale to Iran to the Contras.

Since the diversion was first revealed by Attorney General Edwin Meese at a White House briefing for reporters last November, the Israeli government has denied any knowledge of the diversion. This denial has been echoed by all Israeli officials who visited Washington over the past nine months. The only evidence linking Israel to the diversion was a tenuous one from Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, the former National Security Council aide. North testified that at a meeting in Washington in January 1985, Amiram Nir, the counter-terrorism advisor to the Israeli Premier, suggested that profits from the sale of arms to Iran could be used for other purposes.

Later at a meeting in Europe between North, Nir and Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian businessman who was a go-between for the dealings with Iran, North said Ghorbanifar pulled him aside and suggested the diversion to the Contras as one of the ideas to convince the reluctant North to continue the Iranian initiative.

North said that he assumed that Ghorbanifar was acting with at least the approval of Israeli intelligence, if not the government, since the late William Casey, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had told him the CIA believed Ghorbanifar to be an Israeli intelligence agent.

Left with no proven Israeli link to the diversion, some have sought to place the responsibility for the Iranian initiative entirely on Israel in an effort to give the Reagan Administration the excuse that “the Israelis made me do it.”

‘WE HAVE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY’

This view was rejected by Secretary of State George Shultz when he testified before the committees. “When it comes to undertaking something by the United States government, then we have to recognize… that we’re big boys and we have to take responsibility for whatever it is we do. We can’t say that somebody else suggested it to us, therefore it’s their fault.”

However, throughout the hearings, Sen. James McClure (R. Idaho) continually questioned witnesses on whether the Israelis had pushed the U.S. into the initiative.

McClure vigorously denied he was anti-Israel at the closing public session Tuesday. However, he added, “We cannot really trace the evolution of American policy in this instance without looking at the influence, the very strong influence, and some would say the very proper influence, of people who are friends of Israel upon U.S. policy and Israeli influence upon our policy.”

Israel officials have made no secret that they believe the effort to establish a link with officials in Iran was a correct policy, as does President Reagan.

During the hearings there was agreement by many on the committees that while the effort may have been justified, it gradually deteriorated into an arms for hostages arrangement, something which Reagan continues to deny strongly.

However, during a meeting with reporters in Washington in June, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin argued that the effort to use the sale of arms to Iran to gain release of the American hostages in Lebanon was justified. He also suggested that Israel is hampered in its efforts to attack terrorists in Lebanon by the fear that the American hostages could be killed in a raid or because of it. Testimony at the hearing left little doubt that Reagan approved the sale by Israel to. Iran of 508 TOW anti-tank missiles in August 1985 and 18 Hawk ground-to-air missiles in November 1985, although after the fact. Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger were opposed to any arms being sold to the Iranians. They had both led Iran of 508 TOW anti-tank missiles in August 1985 and 18 Hawk ground-to-air missiles in November 1985, although after the fact. Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger were opposed to any arms being sold to the Iranians. They had both led the U.S. effort to try to get other countries not to sell arms to either side in the Iran-Iraq war.

Testimony in the final days of the public hearing revealed that at a November 1985 meeting called to discuss the sale of arms, Shultz said that he felt “the Israelis sucked us up into their operation so we could not object to their (arms) sale to Iran.”

Weinberger, who had made a note of this remark, said Tuesday that while he had no personal knowledge of previous Israeli arms sales to Iran, there had been consistent reports on this throughout the U.S. government. He said when the Israelis had been confronted with the charge they said they had U.S. approval, from former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, for example.

Weinberger also testified that he had raised the possibility that the U.S. could be subject to “blackmail” from Iran, Israel or others if it went through with the secret arms deal. He again raised this possibility in November 1986 in urging a full disclosure by the Administration after the effort had become public.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL

The hearings also confirmed the difference between the U.S. and Israel on the Iran-Iraq war. While the U.S. has publicly called for a ceasefire with no victors or losers, Israel has leaned toward Iran with which it had good relations until the Shah was overthrown.

“As everybody knows, I am a very warm supporter of a strong relationship with Israel,” Shultz told the committees. “However, I think we have to recognize that while our interests and Israel’s interests are parallel in many respects, they are not always exactly the same. We have to be smart enough to see that. They have legitimate interests which are not necessarily exactly our interests.”

In his testimony. North also testified that Israel and the U.S. differed on the Iran-Iraq war, but were in “basic fundamental agreement,” on the need for the initiative to Iran. “I believe that there was sufficient congruence between Israeli objectives and American objectives that made this project worthwhile,” he said.

Rear Adm. John Poindexter, the former National Security Advisor, in his testimony, said that he accepted the Israeli assessment in November 1985, that Iran was losing the war with Iraq. Shultz and Weinberger, however, said that U.S. intelligence believed that Iraq was the one in danger of being defeated.

CONTINUING TO TAKE CLOSED-DOOR TESTIMONY

While the public hearings are over, the committees are continuing to take closed-door testimony from CIA officials and from Michael Ledeen, the former consultant to the National Security Council, who first explored with Israel and others the possibility of making contact with Iranian officials. Ledeen said in a television interview Tuesday that he was asked in 1985 by Robert McFarlane, then the National Security Advisor. to look into the possibility of such an initiative. The committees are expected to release a joint report in late September. One aspect that will be eagerly awaited is the assessment of the material the committees have received from Israel.

Israel provided the committees in June with details of its financial transactions in the Iran affair and last week turned over a 60-page chronology from the beginning of the Iran affair through Dec. 31, 1985. A chronology that will take Israel’s participation to November 1986, when the initiative was revealed, is still being prepared.

The chronology is largely based on testimony from David Kimche, the former director general of the Foreign Ministry, and two Israeli arms dealers, Yaacov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer.

Both Schwimmer and Kimche have been subpoenaed by Lawrence Walsh, the special prosecutor investigating the Iran/Contra affair. Israel is seeking to have the subpoenas quashed on the grounds that the two were acting for the Israeli government.