Kissinger’s Current Mideast Trip Will Decide Fate of Second Stage Settlement Between Egypt, Israel

Israeli officials, preparing to welcome Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger who is due here tomorrow, are convinced that this week’s Mideast trip will be decisive for the fate of the second-stage settlement between Israel and Egypt. Israel has not been told formally or directly that Kissinger will cease his efforts if he fails to achieve a breakthrough this time. But the Secretary’s assertion to this effect at a briefing to U.S. newsmen last Thursday in Washington was clearly intended to percolate through to Israeli officials–as indeed it did.

While Kissinger himself has unofficially aired the possibility of another trip next month, officials here are certain that this would only be undertaken if substantial progress is made on this week’s visit. This morning the Cabinet launched into a discussion of the options facing Israel. The ministers began by hearing Ambassador Simcha Dinitz’s report of the latest thinking in the American Admin istration.

Dinitz told reporters on his arrival here Friday that the U.S. is not pressuring Israel to enter into a new stage of peace negotiations with Egypt and was anxious to keep Israel strong enough to deter aggression. Dinitz echoed Kissinger’s assertion that his latest Mideast tour, which will include visits to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well as to Israel, was purely exploratory and involved no plans for a new diplomatic peace offensive at this stage.

Briefing the Cabinet, which met for six hours today to discuss the options facing Israel, Dinitz described the economic difficulties in the U.S. which, he said, is leading to greater conservationism and discernment in matters of foreign aid. He pointed out that the sharp rise in Israel’s aid request for the coming year in comparison to past years is adding to the difficulties involved in procuring Israel’s needs. Dinitz also stated that there is no erosion in popular U.S. support for Israel, but urged heightened informational efforts to maintain that situation.

LINEUP OF ‘DOVES’ AND ‘HAWKS’

There are widely reported differences of assessment here, principally between Premier Yitzhak Rabin and Defense Minister Shimon Peres, with the “doves” and “hawks” lining up behind each of them respectively. The Defense Minister is said to be much less sanguine, and much more cynical, as to the prospect of a second stage accord in which Israel would obtain really meaningful political returns from Egypt. Peres is said to be extremely loathe to withdraw from the Mitla and Gidi passes, except in exchange for the most far-reaching Egyptian political concessions in the form of binding undertakings of non-belligerency, which are seen as most unlikely.

The Premier, for his part, has stated repeatedly in recent days and still firmly believes that Kissinger’s stage-by-stage efforts offer the only realistic prospect of progress; and moreover that only by cooperating with the Secretary’s efforts will Israel continue to foster the harmony and basic rapport which have characterized its political relationship with the U.S. Administration since the Yom Kippur War. Rabin believes that both Israel’s and America’s interests are best served by deferring a return to Geneva until after a partial settlement with Egypt is reached.

According to informed sources the Premier is asking the Cabinet for a broad mandate for the ministerial negotiating team to discuss a number of possible scenarios with Kissinger. In his ABC-TV “AM America” interview to be screened tomorrow in the U.S., Rabin proposed ceding both the passes and the Abu Rodeis oil fields in return for a formal declaration of non-belligerency from Egypt. Kissinger, sources here say, will want to elicit from Israel a clear and authoritative position on what it would demand–in terms of Egyptian political concessions–in return for one or other of these strategic assets, and what Israel expects to obtain from Egypt in return for a withdrawal which would embrace neither of them.

Kissinger’s stay in Jerusalem–from Monday evening to Wednesday morning, will be unusually long, and observers here see in this schedule a reflection of Kissinger’s determination to obtain a clear picture of Israel’s positions with which to travel on to Cairo. He will return to Israel, via Syria and Jordan, on Thursday.

Thus, if in the course of his talks with Rabin, Peres, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, Chief of Staff Gen. Mordecai Gur and their top aides, the need arises for a full Cabinet consultation, this would be possible during Kissinger’s stay here–and its results could be discussed further with the Secretary.

SUBTLE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL

Some observers here see the extended duration of Kissinger’s visit in Jerusalem as a means of exerting subtle pressure on Israel to produce at last its definitive positions on the possible scenarios for a settlement. Informed sources said that while Rabin had revived, in the ABC interview and other appearances, the “formal non-belligerency” demand, this did not mean that Israel was inflexible toward far-reaching possibilities. The “piece of territory for a piece of peace” formula was still the valid guideline of Israel’s approach, the sources said. Israeli policy-makers would look at four aspects of a possible settlement to determine Israel’s response in terms of cession of land.

These are physical arrangements on the ground, and especially demilitarization and limited forces zones; “political provisions” such as a relaxation of economic and political warfare; access for Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal; direct travel by foreign tourists between the two countries; and many other actions which, Israel believes, would in time serve to normalize relations and prepare the way for a lasting peace settlement.

In addition, Israel would seek indirect benefits, mainly the reopening of the Suez Canal and civilian stabilization of the Canal Zone which would follow upon a new Israel-Egypt settlement, Time, the duration of the second-stage agreement, would be seen here as a vital indicator of Egypt’s ultimate intentions. These aspects taken together would be set off against the risks of the various possible withdrawals that Israel could make.

DIVISION OVER VALUE OF PASSES

Strategists here seem to be divided as to the value of the Mitla and Gidi passes. Some experts believe that provided the demilitarization provisions were iron-clad and firmly precluded a return of the Egyptian army to the passes, an Israel withdrawal from them would not be a crippling move from the defense standpoint. Others believe that once the passes are vacated, the entire strategic worth of the Sinai peninsula would be gravely weakened.

This latter view is supported by those, like former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who advocate a return to Geneva now. They counsel against returning the passes in return for what they believe would be a transient and ultimately insignificant pause. Better to go to Geneva while still in possession of these major assets and use them there as effective bargaining counters, Eban and others have advised.