Luke Whitewashed, Police Force Praised, in Preedy’s Summary

Giving the Palestine police a clean bill of health for their actions during the August riots and refuting the charges made against the then Acting High Commissioner H. C. Luke by innumerable Jewish witnesses and by Sir Boyd Merriman, counsel for the Jews, Kenelm Preedy, counsel for the Palestine administration at the Inquiry Commission hearings, in his summing up yesterday of the government’s case, lent credence to the slogan “the government is with us” which the attacking Arabs shouted during the assaults on the Jews.

Upholding the theory that the Arabs came to Jerusalem on August 23, the day when the riots broke out, armed because they feared that the Jews would attack them, Preedy suggested that the reason for the arriving Arabs not having been disarmed was that “the Jews attacked the Arabs and the Arabs attacked the Jews and the Arabs, not unnaturally being afraid, armed themselves for self-defense, and while they may have come to Jerusalem for assault, their primary reason was self-defense.”

To have disarmed them, said Preedy, would have given ground to the already current rumor that the government favored the Jews. Briefly dismissing the beginning of the riots, he passed over the fact that the Arabs of the countryside around Jerusalem were on mischief bent and that the police knew it, or if they did not know of it, they (Continued on Page 4)

ANALYZES CHARGES AGAINST LUKE

Before a crowded court room, including many Jewish leaders, Preedy referred to the Commission’s task and recalled that from the start the government had not recognized any of the charges made against it. He declared that it had faithfully placed all of the police records before the Commission, as it had promised. Preedy then plunged into a minute analysis of Merriman’s case, in which it was charged that Luke had yielded to the Arabs under their insistent threats. Referring to Merriman’s comment on Luke’s forgetfulness, Preedy asked whether Sir Boyd attacked Luke’s lack of memory or whether he suggested that Luke had a convenient memory. If the latter was meant, Preedy insisted, it was a serious charge.

Emphasizing that the Palestine government’s decision permitting the Moslem building operations at the Wailing Wall had been made on the advice of the British government, Preedy said that he was not suggesting that the gentlemen temporarily in charge of the Palestine Zionist Executive had deliberately raised the question of the status quo in order to cause trouble, but he pointed out that all things that happened at Zurich were reported in Jerusalem and affected the public mind. “You must be satisfied that if any man ever carried out his duty conscientiously and intelligently under trying circumstances, Luke had done so.”

HAS HIGH PRAISE FOR POLICE

Completing his tribute to Luke, Preedy complimented the police. “I have no hesitation in assuming your verdict with regard to the police. Nobody reading these reports can help being filled with admiration for them. This applies also to the Palestine police, Moslem, Christian and Jew, but particularly to the British police and the special constables who for ten days often went without food and sleep. Remembering the embittered feelings, it is remarkable that the disaster was not greater.” He pointed out that in 135 Jewish colonies, only 13 Jews were killed, overlooking the fact that the bulk of the casualties were in Hebron, Safed and Jerusalem where the Jews were unarmed. The police record, he said, was one to be proud of and “those in responsible positions,” referring to the Zionist Executive, “should have returned more than criticism.”

Preedy scoffed at Isaiah Braude’s suggestion that the police should have been brought in from the countryside because if the trouble had been stopped in time in Jerusalem, it would not have spread. Neither Luke nor the government are responsible if the police strength was insufficient, said Preedy, but although disaster came, the use of the police and military was wise. Scoring Harry Sacher’s charge that Luke was to blame for the riots, Preedy said that if the disposition of the police was wrong, then Major Allan Saunders was to blame and he accepts full responsibility.

EXPLAINS JAFFA ROAD ATTACKS

Citing the evidence by police officer Monroe that it would have been murder to open fire on the Jerusalem mob pouring out at the Jaffa Gate, Preedy argued that firing on them would have killed innocent and guilty, Jews among them. He excused Constable White’s failure to shoot after the mob had killed the Rothenberg brothers on the ground that it was impossible to shoulder a rifle owing to the thick mass of the crowd and he had therefore used the butt of his weapon. (Preedy diverged here to say that Arab and Jewish evidence is conflicting, but that he is inclined to think that the Rothenbergs were the first victims that day.) Preedy’s theory of the events on the Jaffa Road outbreak when Raitain was killed and Wolfgang von Weisl wounded, dovetails with the Arab explanation that the mob attacked because the Jews shouted “booz,” the Hebrew equivalent for “shame.” and hurled missiles from the Slonim building.

Preedy quibbled over Merriman’s statement that by the time the mob had marched to the Jaffa Road there had already been four murders in an hour. Preedy insisted that the murders occurred within twenty minutes and he tried to make capital of Merriman’s failure to cross-examine Monroe for his failure to open fire.

APOLOGIZES FOR LUKE

In contrast to the seven hours consumed by Merriman in his recapitulation, and the five-hour summary of Stoker. Preedy’s conclusion at the end of three hours came as a surprise. His address was in the main an apology for the behavior of former Acting High Commissioner Luke.

Constantly appealing to the Commission to put itself in Luke’s place Preedy argued that it is difficult to make decisions regarding events that are past. If, he stated, the Jewish procession on Tisha B’Ab had been stopped, the Jews would have protested. If the Moslem demonstration at the Wailing Wall the following day had been prevented and blood spilled, “think of the effect on three hundred million Moslems.”

Charging that the Zionist Executive was helpful only until the funeral of Abraham Mizrachi, and afterward concentrated only on criticism and accusation of the government, Preedy asserted that Jewish warnings of disaster communicated to Luke were ague, and he asked the Commission o consider Luke’s position if he had called the troops and nothing had occurred. He apparently assumed that troops were only sent to quell, not to avert disturbances.

NO EVIDENCE OF MUFTI’S CONSPIRACY

Continuing, Preedy said that if there had been any evidence of a conspiracy of incitement among the Grand Mufti, Subhi Khadra, and others, the government would have prosecuted such evidence to find out why such a conspiracy existed. That is why, the government counsel said, he did not cross-examine the Arab witnesses but did cross-examine the Jewish witnesses thoroughly-the latter having accused the government.

“How would Luke be cognizant of Friday’s impending outbreak,” Preedy asked, “when the Arab and Jewish representatives who met at his house on August 22, were ignorant of it and planned to meet again the following Monday?”

NOT GOVERNMENT’S JOB TO DENY RUMORS

A very large intelligence service would be required to follow up inciting propaganda of the press, he pleaded, in answer to testimony of Harry Sacher and statements by Merriman as regards Arab incitement in the press. Moreover, he averred, it was not the business of the government to issue disclaimers on behalf of the Zionists about the Moslem holy places. “How does the government know,” he queried, “what the Zionists think?” He overlooked Merriman’s argument which deposed that Col. Amery had made a statement in Parliament which the Palestine government should have broadcast.

Without explaining the disarming of the Jewish constables, Preedy briefly referred to Luke’s denial that action taken was weak. To disprove Merriman’s statement that British officials are out of sympathy with the idea of a Jewish National Home, Preedy merely used Luke’s denial, adding, “British officials are not really charged with carrying out to completion something the Zionists think they ought to have.”

Devoting but five minutes to discussion of Arab land and immigration grievances, and remarking that the Commission had all the evidence as to these, Preedy declined to comment on recommendations made by both sides, saying the Palestine government’s duty was to administer, not to formulate a policy.

139 WITNESSES HEARD

The Commission hearings ended abruptly, after one hundred and fifteen witnesses had been heard publicly and twenty-four in private. The chairman expressed the hope that methods would be devised for the purpose of securing future good government of the country and peace in the different colonies. In view of Premier MacDonald’s announcement that he is considering another commission which will have power to survey the Palestine problem from all angles, Shaw’s statement that the future policy of the country would be based on the departing Commission’s findings seems somewhat over-optimistic.