Premier Golda Meir today strongly defended her government’s disengagement agreement with Egypt, declaring that the only alternative was a resumption of war, that its aim was to advance toward a permanent peace settlement and that it was signed out of Israeli strength, not weakness. Mrs. Meir spoke at length during the first working session of the new Knesset. Her remarks were followed by a gruelling ten-hour debate during which Likud opposition leader Menachem Beigin denounced the agreement as capitulation and castigated Premier Meir’s government in general and her top-ranking ministers individually for-being party to it. But the fiery Likud spokesman could offer no viable alternative when he was asked pointedly for one by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. His Likud colleague, Gen. Ariel Sharon, attempted later on to answer the key question but his ideas were vague and Likud’s policies remained unclear to objective listeners. At the end of the debate the Knesset voted 76-35 in favor of the accord.
Mrs. Meir referred to the agreement as “the fruit of our victory in the war, but we do not ignore the fact that it also reflects Egypt’s achievements during the first days of the fighting.” Speaking of the danger of escalation she revealed that since Oct. 22 there had been 1075 shooting incidents on the Egyptian front–costing Israel 22 dead and 107 wounded. As to the future, Mrs. Meir said the military and strategic position along the new line to be held by Israel would be “suitable to their military purpose in the event of fighting.” She added: “Throughout the entire region east of the Gidi and Mitla passes the Israeli army will remain deployed, in all strength required, prepared for any eventuality. The forces stationed in the restricted zones complement the basic military deployment of the Israel army and their capability to meet any violence and its capability to meet any violation of the cease-fire.”
Regarding the role of UNEF, the Premier declared: “We are not relying on the UN forces, but on ourselves.” Nevertheless, she continued, so long as there was to permanent peace the UN role was important in maintaining the agreed buffer zone. Any unilateral indication by Egypt that it wanted the UNEF force out would be taken by Israel as evidence of “menacing plans,” she warned. The Premier stated that despite contrary announcements and statements emanating from Cairo, “a careful examination of statements by…authoritative. Egyptian spokesmen shows that the government of Egypt intends to start clearing the canal and fitting it out for shipping once more, and to work towards the repopulation and rebuilding of the abandoned towns and restoration of normal civilian life there.” This action could be “a highly significant turning point in the development of the region, a turning point in the direction of peace,” Mrs. Meir said.
She stated, that various documents which, had not been published but which were part and parcel of the disengagement agreement had been shown by the government to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Mrs. Meir praised the U.S. government and President Nixon’s help for Israel and particularly Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger’s personal efforts in bringing about the agreement. He, unlike previous middlemen, had not taken a position himself but had remained the honest broker, faithfully explaining Egypt’s considerations to us and also making clear to Egypt Israel’s positions, the Premier said.
She was vague on the American role in the agreement itself, but said that because of its role in bringing about the agreement it “became a factor capable of testifying to the intentions of the parties …and the exact nature of the commitments undertaken by them. Israel attaches considerable importance to this role played by the U.S. The U.S. could prove invaluable in the promotion of relations between the two parties and the continued observance of the settlement.” Regarding Syria–she regretted that she could report no progress, with the Damascus government still refusing to publish the POW lists and allow Red Cross visits. “This refusal is unsurpassed in its brutality” she said. Kissinger “was unable to tell us that he had succeeded in his efforts to move matters from a state of deadlock but we have been promised that his efforts will continue.”
Beigin flayed the government for 40 minutes. It entered into a fateful agreement, he said, without asking for a mandate from the voters to undertake a unilateral withdrawal before there is peace. He claimed that the Meir government had in fact abandoned all of its past positions–namely that no Egyptian troops would be permitted east of the Suez Canal and that there would be no linkage between an Israeli withdrawal from the canal’s east banks and Resolution 242. These were the positions taken when Israel first proposed an interim agreement in 1970 and were supported even by the most doveish elements in the government, Beigin said.
Now all of these principles have gone by the board, Beigin charged. The government has given in to Egyptian demands for linkage, for troops on the east bank, for withdrawal without peace–and all this while Egyptian and other Arab spokesmen still aspired to the obliteration of Israel, Beigin said. The Likud leader also served warning on the government not to enter into any agreement with Jordan that would “re-divide Eretz Israel.” He claimed there were 54 Likud and religious bloc votes in the Knesset plus many Labor votes that oppose “this talk of disengagement with Jordan.”
Dayan said Israel’s prime motive in accepting the disengagement agreement had been that it was based on an Egyptian undertaking to reopen the Suez Canal and restore normal life and commerce in the towns that flanked it. Despite contradictory statements from Egypt, Dayan believed this was indeed President Sadat’s intention and that he sought if not peace at least the restoration of peaceful life in the canal zone. Dayan conceded that the new Israeli lines were not as good as the Canal line but afforded good defensive positions. He said Israel could not know for sure that Egypt would abide by its commitments–but the risk was one worth taking since the new agreement did not prejudice Israel’s vital security needs. If Egypt did reopen the canal as it promised, the shipping and connected commercial activity would in themselves serve to reduce the possibility of a new outbreak of fighting, Dayan said.
Sharon Joined Beigin in denouncing the disengagement agreement. In his maiden Knesset speech, the former division commander on the Suez front repeated his charge made at a press conference several days ago that the government relinquished militarily vital topographical areas of the Sinai which had cost hundreds of casualties to defend in the Yom Kippur War. He said the new lines were relatively unimportant in military terms. He said Likud wanted a peace or other arrangement with Egypt no less than anyone else and that his party had a peace plan which involved fewer risks for Israel. He did not say what it was. He insisted that it was a grave mistake for Israel to regard the reopening of the Suez Canal’ and the rehabilitation of civilian life in the canal side towns as an indication of Egypt’s peaceful intentions. Sharon noted, as an example, that the repopulation of the canalised towns will not prevent war as it had not prevented the war of attrition in 1969 when, three-quarters of a million people still lived in the region.
The vote for the government position now paves the way for Israel to begin its withdrawal Friday from the banks of the canal. In the vote all factions–including Rakah–voted with the government and only Likud opposed. Veteran observers saw in the Rakah vote the first clear sign that Moscow is satisfied with the disengagement agreement and was probably involved in Kissinger’s efforts, or at least approved them.
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