A stunned nation reacted with mixed emotions today to the Agranat Committee’s partial report blaming Chief of Staff Gen. David Elazar and other high ranking officers for costly errors on the eve of the Yom Kippur War while absolving the nation’s political leadership. Predictably many were calling the report a whitewash that made Elazar the scapegoat for misjudgments and miscalculations for which the political leaders were at least equally to blame.
Others felt that no other conclusions could have been reached by the committee at this time in view of the tense and delicate political situation and ongoing military problems. Elazar, in his letter of resignation to the Cabinet last night said the committee had done him an injustice.
See Page 2 for Elazar’s reply to the charges and separate story on replacements following major shake-up of Israeli high command.
Premier Golda Meir accepted Elazar’s resignation with “a heavy heart” and assured the 48-year-old general that he would “remain in the annals of Israel’s history as a great soldier and commander.” Elazar’s most bitter critic. Res. Gen. Ariel Sharon, the Likud leader, would say only that he stood by what he had said in the past and expressed confidence that the army would weather “this crisis.” Sharon, whose public differences with the high command sparked a major controversy alter the Yom Kippur War was the first senior officer to call for Elazar’s resignation. Another Likud leader. Menachem Beigin demanded that the Cabinet resign in the wake of the Agranat committee’s report.
DEALS ONLY WITH PERIOD BEFORE WAR
The 35-page report by the five-man panel headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Shimon Agranat covered only the period prior to the outbreak of the war last Oct.6th. Activities during the war itself are still under study by the committee. But the committee’s findings to date, based on the testimony of 58 witnesses taken during 140 sessions over the past four months, was an indictment of Israel’s top military leadership, excluding Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.
In addition to Elazar, the committee recommended the removal of Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zeira. the intelligence chief; his deputy, Brig. Gen. Arieh Shalev; Lt. Col. Yona Bendman and Lt. Col David Gedalia. It also proposed the suspension from active duty of Maj. Gen. Shmuel Gonen, commander on the Egyptian front when the war broke out, pending further investigation.
FAILED TO WEIGH ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Israel’s outspoken daily press which often mirrors public opinion, accused the Agranat Committee of failure to weigh the responsibility of the civilian political leadership equally with that of the military. The Histadrut daily, Davar spoke of “obvious discrimination” between the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense. The Mapam organ, Al Hamishmar, observed that Dayan was at least an equal partner to the decisions made by the military command. The National Religious Party daily. Hatzofe, said the committee should have verified what was the political role in appointments to the high command.
The independent newspaper. Haaretz, said there was room to wonder to what extent the Defense Minister was responsible for the appointment to top command of men now found unqualified to continue in office. Haaretz claimed that the non-political nature of the Agranat Committee was no guarantee that it would not be biased in favor of the political authorities.
In addition to Chief Justice Agranat, the committee is composed of Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau: State Controller Yitzhak Nebenzahi: and Yigael Yadin and Haim Laskov, both former chiefs of staff. All are regarded as men of unimpeachable integrity.
HIGHLIGHTS OF REPORT
Following are highlights of the committee’s partial report, presented at a special session of the Cabinet last night and made public shortly before midnight: The report said that the intelligence network was “blinded” and thus failed to give the defense forces adequate advance notice of the pending attack. This not only caused a delay in calling up reserve forces to the front but delayed the deployment of forces positioned near the borders to meet an enemy advance.
The basic reasons given for the intelligence failure was “a blind belief” in the preconception that the Egyptians would not go to war until they were able to stage deep air strikes into Israel. particularly against Israel’s major military airfields in order to neutralize Israel’s Air force; a related belief that Syria would not go to war without Egypt.
The report found that Zeira had made a firm undertaking to provide the army with adequate warning should war become a certainty when he had no basis to make such a promise. The Army intelligence Research Department possessed a vast amount of deterrent information which had been supplied both by army field intelligence and other bodies, but because of their refusal to budge from preconceived ideas, the Office of Chief of Intelligence and the head of research did not appraise their information correctly, the report charged.
UNJUSTIFIABLE DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT
The intelligence chiefs claimed that the noted Syrian military build-up was of a defensive nature and that the massing of Egyptian forces in the vicinity of the Suez Canal was nothing more than annual maneuvers, the Agranat Committee said. The report provided minute details of events during the hours immediately preceding the Egyptian-Syrian attack. It said that it was not until 4:30 a.m. on the day of the attack that army intelligence finally concluded that war was imminent but even then it erroneously believed the attack would not be launched until 6 p.m.
The report stated that while army intelligence mistakes were not the only ones that led to Israel’s defense forces being caught off guard. “first and foremost there was an unjustifiable delay in the deployment of the reserves.” The report continued.
“We are convinced beyond doubt that the Chief of Staff should have requested a call up of reserves in the week preceding the outbreak of hostilities to maintain a realistic balance between enemy forces and Israeli forces along the borders. At the very least, the Chief of Staff should have ordered a call up on the morning of Oct. 5 even if enemy intentions were not entirely clear.”
The committee found that despite clear warnings of impending war, no steps were taken to deploy the armored force in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, no clear instructions were given to the commander of the southern front to meet an attack and clear instructions were also lacking on the northern front.
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