Report Nixon, Ford Assured Arab Leaders That U.S. Favored an Israeli Withdrawal to 1967 Lines

A report in the magazine “Foreign Policy,” that Presidents Nixon and Ford in 1974-75 “secretly assured Arab leaders that the United States favored an Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders” brought an official U.S. reiteration yesterday that the United States stands by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.

According to the article by Edward R. F. Sheehan, “How Kissinger Did It, Step By Step In the Middle East,” Nixon made “significant promises to the Arab chiefs of state” that “involved the American interpretation” of that resolution during his Middle East trip in June, 1974 when he met with Egyptian President Sadat, Syrian President Hassad and Jordan’s King Hussein.

“President Ford reaffirmed Nixon’s position on the 1967 frontiers to Sadat last June in Salzburg,” Sheehan, a former U.S. foreign service officer, claimed. Concerning Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger’s position, Sheehan wrote: “On the territorial dimension of 242, Kissinger has commonly been accused of making contradictory promises to Arabs and Israelis.” He added: “But, in fact, such duplicity is difficult to establish . . . Certainly Kissinger allowed the Arabs to think he favored complete or substantial Israeli withdrawal.”

Sheehan quoted Sadat as having told him (Sheehan) “I have assurances from Kissinger,” on total withdrawal but Sheehan said, “this may have been Sadat’s wishful exegesis of ‘Mr. Henry’s’ conundrum.” Sheehan reported that “according to an Israeli journal” Kissinger told American Jewish intellectual’s on Dec. 3, 1973 “that Israel would not have to withdraw to its 1967 borders but stressed that Israel would be obliged to return “substantial territories.”

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON U.S. POLICY

Regarding the alleged Presidential remarks concerned by Sheehan the State Department said that it “is not going to comment on alleged conversations between the President and other leaders,” The Department then added:

“American policy on the question of final boundaries in the Middle East remains what has been stated so many times. We support the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 which sets out the elements to be included in a peace settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. That resolution combines Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories with acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area within secure and recognized boundaries in the context of peace.

“We have repeatedly said and we repeat once again it is for the parties themselves to work out implementation of this resolution-including their negotiation of the final boundaries between them. It is not for the United States to present a blueprint for a final settlement or to draw boundaries.”

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency asked whether Kissinger himself had cleared the Department statement and was told the Secretary had not, but it was prepared on very high levels in the Department.

SOFTENING PRO-PALESTINIAN ATTITUDE

Sheehan’s 2100-word account of Kissinger’s Mideast diplomacy from the Yom Kippur War to the reassessment period of last summer concluded that “until now Israeli intransigence has prevailed” and quoted Kissinger as saying “Israel has no foreign policy only domestic policies.”

Kissinger “might have uttered” the same view about the United States “especially as it involves the Middle East,” Sheehan commented. He noted that “Israel’s American constituency is the greatest constraint upon our policy” and that a Kissinger aide told him that “the constraint becomes the determinant.” Kissinger’s Arab policy is “still anchored to Sadat,” Sheehan wrote, and “there are signs that Kissinger-eager to revive the confidence of (Syrian President Hafez) Assad-is softening his attitude toward the Palestinians.”

Sheehan’s article carried numerous quotations from Mideast leaders and a score of passages that appear to be extracts of transcripts of conversations by Kissinger with them. In responding to questions about the article, the State Department took the extraordinary step of putting out a statement in writing that Sheehan did not “see transcripts, memorandum or official records” and that as far as the Department is concerned,” it would be “inaccurate to describe the conversations and quotations as verbatim.”

The statement also said that Sheehan’s use of briefings “represented gross violations of confidence and not authorized by the Secretary.” Sheehan, is described here as a free-lance writer on the Middle East who has written for the New York Times and served at U.S. embassies in Cairo and Beirut between 1957 and 1961. Last year he traveled on a Kissinger plane when the Secretary shuttled between Mideast capitals seeking an agreement. He is a Harvard Research Fellow.

SHEEHAN’S ACCOUNT ASSAILED

For the most part, Sheehan’s account is laudatory of Kissinger and his conclusions on the possible settlement in the Middle East reflect views of former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, whom Sheehan describes as a “non-Zionist.” “Foreign Policy” magazine said that the article would be published this fall at greater length by Readers Digest Press.

A source knowledgeable about Israeli circumstances described the Sheehan account as “biased, distorted and inaccurate.” It was also noted by an independent analyst that the State Department statement did not deny Sheehan’s account about Presidents Nixon and Ford, which left the impression that such statements were made orally and not in writing.