News Brief

The next major move in the Middle East entanglement will come from the Kremlin. At least two developments point to this expectation. The first is President Sadat’s widening and deepening purge of pro-Soviet elements in Egypt’s governmental apparatus. The other is Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring’s announced quick return to Moscow after he and Secretary General U Thant had heard Secretary of State William P. Rogers’ report on his talks in the Middle East. Suspicious of Rogers’ intentions even before he began his tour, the Russians betrayed their nervousness after he finished it. Thus, Moscow Radio broadcast that “American politicians are ready to use any means and measures to get into the good graces of the Arabs” and “one of these measures is to show that the American government is allegedly sincere in coming out for compliance with the just demands of the Arabs…” But Moscow Radio warned, too, that the Rogers’ plan is “only a political bluff” and his tour “has proved this quite clearly.” Actually, Israel is “to be the principal U.S. military mainstay” in the Middle East “against those not to the liking of the U.S.” and “primarily” Egypt and Syria. But to observers here, discussion of the reopening of the Suez Canal appears to be a cover-up on the real issues facing the Soviets. If Sadat remains in power, the Kremlin may well face the dread prospect of withdrawal from the Nile and the fading of their dreams for expansion into the Indian Ocean.

The Soviets may arrange for Sadat’s downfall; perhaps through the Egyptian Army which uses Soviet equipment. But there is at least the possibility of a stunning political turnabout in great power influence in Egypt. Whether this happens, and when, depend both on the skillfulness of western diplomacy in dealing with the wily Sadat and on Soviet persuasions with Sadat’s opposition. The first outlines of the opposing strategy now seem to be marked out and Israel is in the jaws of the pincers. The Rogers’ visit to Cairo, as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency has previously noted, was not about the Suez solution alone. A major purpose was to sound out Cairo on the return of American diplomatic and economic relations and a commensurate decrease in Soviet power there. The strategy is not for Sadat to double-cross the Russians but to engage in the kind of triple play whereby, as Yugoslavia did in the 1950’s, Egypt obtains support from both Moscow and Washington. That President Tito did not go to Cairo for the funeral of his bosom friend Colonel Nasser in order to consult with President Nixon in Belgrade last Autumn (Sept. 29-Oct. 2) is not to be overlooked in this context. Nor, certainly, Tito’s visit to Cairo in mid-February. The Soviet’s main investments in Egypt are the Aswan Dam and the enormous military outlay. The Kremlin also has pledged, among other things, to provide rural electrification from the Aswan, steel works, and an improved civil air transport system. It also pledged to buy up Egypt’s surplus cotton.

MURKEY WATERS OF NILE POLITICS MAY DELAY NEGOTIATIONS FOR MIDEAST SOLUTION

These pledges can be easily matched by the United States. But more importantly, it might also promise special delivery of a prize that neither Nasser nor Sadat could get from the Russians–Sinai. Now as to Dr. Jarring. Having been publicly reassured by Rogers that Dr. Jarring is the “focus” of the Middle East negotiations, the Swedish Ambassador returns to Moscow with what may well be a change in emphasis in his mission. With the over-all agreement shelved for the present, the new approach, it is seen here, may be to persuade Moscow to accept a step-by-step program. Reopening of the canal may well be delayed while Egypt’s internal convulsions subside but considerations can be given by the Kremlin to convincing Syria to forget Golan Heights as a move toward a broader settlement and for Jordan to consider an arrangement on the West Bank that Israel could accept. To think the unthinkable, perhaps Egypt may ask the Soviet to contribute cash towards settling the refugee problem. Meanwhile, the pressures on Israel mount. The Six European Economic Commission countries, shortly after Rogers had visited Paris, gave rhetorical support to the Arab position in terms even more drastic than Egypt’s own demands against Israel.

Editorialists see, like the Manchester Guardian, that “it will be in Israel’s interests to stick with President Sadat as a negotiating opponent and to cooperate in speedy progress toward an overall Egypt-Israel settlement. For delay could make Sadat’s position untenable. His replacement might make war unavoidable.” The Washington Post points out “some” think that the U.S. must help Sadat capitalize on the defeat of the Moscow-minded hawks in Cairo and “put the squeeze” on Israel. To the Yorkshire Post it “seems likely” that the State Department will “privately take the line” that Sadat, “if given half a chance, would seek to reduce direct Soviet influence but that, if he were to fail, there could be a shift of power only to the hardliners.” But if Sadat, as news reports indicate, has to demonstrate that he is genuinely Egypt’s champion and the west supports him, the cost in great part to sustain him must be borne by Israel. That is, for Israel to surrender at least Sinai and without the guarantee of either a permanent or a long-term lease at Sharm el-Sheikh. In this complexity, the only prophecy that seems likely is that active negotiations for Middle East solutions will not start soon openly. The political waters have been stirred up too much by what has happened recently in Cairo and by what is being plotted in Moscow and along the Nile.