Zionist Action and Development Eban Sees Support for His Views

Abba Eban has emerged from the Labor Alignment’s “political debate” satisfied and encouraged. The debate clearly showed, he says, that he is not “an eccentric loner” within the Labor movement, a “maverick” in his questioning of the government’s peace policy. The views which he stated in the first session of the debate were echoed by veteran Mapam leaders, by some ex-Ahdut Haovadah members, and by several members of ex-Mapai including Pinhas Sapir.

Political pundits have calculated that almost half of the thirty-odd speakers who took part in “the great debate” sided with Eban in his call for the government to draft an overall peace plan now, and to draft its territorial provisions doveishly.

Eban believes his own outspoken criticism of the government was the cause or at least the catalyst of the decision to hold the debate. And the debate, he says, was thoroughly beneficial, With all speakers deliberately avoiding polemics and personal recriminations, it was conducted on a consistently worthwhile level. What had at one stage threatened to degenerate into a personalized feud between himself and the Premier developed instead into a sincere effort by the ruling political party to examine its policies with a view, perhaps, to rethinking them.

DEBATE SHOULD CONTINUE

Eban notes that many observers saw him as the focus of the doveish camp which evolved during the debate beyond the former dove-hawk demarcation lines, and certainly transverse the old factional divides within the Labor Alignment. He believes that the continuation and intensification of the debate is inevitable as the “moment of truth” inexorably approaches, Many observers see him taking a leadership role in the ongoing evolution of the enlarged doveish bloc.

Eban points out that his tactical–as distinct from long-term strategic–criticisms of the government’s present policy were shared by more than half of the participants in the debate. Former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, for instance, who does not share Eban’s minimalist views on borders, agreed with him nevertheless on the need for the government to seize the political initiative and break out of its present do-nothing posture, Eban remarks, Many of those defending the government’s tactics were in fact members of the Cabinet, who share responsibility for them and could hardly have been expected to speak otherwise, Eban points out. The current Israeli position, Eban says, is that “we have nothing more to offer on an interim settlement and do not wish to discuss at this stage an overall settlement.”

He expects that an intensive effort will be made during the Ford-Rabin talks next week to investigate what chance there is for resuscitating the interim settlement talks–and believes that an interim settlement will in fact be attained soon. He expects President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to press Egypt to soften–at least cosmetically–the position it adopted at the time of the suspension of the Kissinger shuttle in March. Israel would then be pressed to produce modifications in its own position which would make a settlement possible.

Eban has all along opposed an interim settlement, mainly because he believes that such vital assets as the Mitle Pass should be traded in the context of a more meaningful and more permanent arrangement. He still feels this way, but he says that if the government still hopes for an interim settlement–as it clearly does–it must strike out to achieve one soon and not allow the post-suspension immobility take root in the region–with all the dangers that immobility can spell.

OPPOSES INTERIM SETTLEMENT

He still believes that an interim settlement will solve nothing in the long- or even medium-range period, and therefore sees little purpose in it, beyond, perhaps, an improvement of the atmosphere at the subsequent resumption of the Geneva conference. For the conference will certainly reconvene, Eban asserts, very probably this year, whether or not there is an interim Israeli-Egyptian accord. “An interim settlement cannot provide a long period of quiescence,” he says. He does not subscribe to Rabin’s thesis that Israel’s prime aim must be to “gain time” through the “seven lean years” ahead, “It is impossible to play for time….We simply won’t be left alone for years after an interim settlement with Egypt…. The Soviets and the Arabs will take us to Geneva soon enough..,” he said.

His “Impression,” says Eban, is that Kissinger is similarly aware of the inevitability and imminence of Geneva, regardless of an interim settlement. The interim settlement has become in the Secretary of State’s thinking, no longer a prelude to it, no longer an alternative to it. The shift is clearly detectable in his public statements during this year.

All this being so, “June 1975 is not too early for the government to tell the people that Geneva is in the offing” and to prepare its peace plan accordingly, Eban says. In his speech at Labor’s “great debate,” Eban outlined a 20-point list of “components of peace” which he recommended that the government demand at Geneva. Peace for the Arabs, he explained, must be a major revolution in their patterns of thought and life. Their fundamental attitude to the existence of Israel must undergo a drastic change–which must find expression in these legal, political, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural provisions which together comprise “peace” as it is understood by other neighboring nations who live side by side without hostility.

URGES ‘MAXIMALIST’ LINE

Israel should begin with a “maximalist” line in its peace demands Eban says. If the Arabs find the list unpalatable in its entirety, then there is logical justification in seeking a compromise–in the form of partial settlements–in which the Arabs accept some of Israel’s peace demands and Israel accept some of the Arabs territorial demands. But it is “not very intelligent” for Israel to expect the Arabs to declare at Geneva that they are ready for peace without Israel simultaneously stating its territorial demands, Eban points out.

Rabin and other ministers have argued that whatever Israel puts forward as its minimal territorial demands will be treated by the other side as maximum bargaining positions–and they conclude therefore that it would be wiser not to draft a peace plan. Eban takes cognizance of the argument, but demurs to the conclusion. He does not propose, he says, that Israel present now precisely delineated maps; but it must make clear its basic “propositions.”

These, he says, should be: That territorial concessions depend in their scope on the Arabs’ response to Israel’s peace demands. That in the event of some Arab response, Israel would insist on extensive demilitarization of areas returned and on changes in the 1967 lines which, while not radically changing the pre-1967 borders, would “significantly change the conditions under which we live.” The aim should be to avoid annexing large areas or large populations. Israel must “stay up on the Golan”–but Eban does not define “stay up.” There would have to be a relatively small change at Rafah (south of the Gaza Strip), retention of control and access at Sharm el-Sheikh (for which a juridical arrangement could be made) and Jerusalem must remain united. Even if these moderate demands were rejected by the Arabs, Eban says they would help Israel’s relations with the powers and the wider world by giving the lie to the “expansionist” allegations.

SEES SUPPORT FOR UNITED JERUSALEM

Israel’s insistence that Jerusalem never be redivided has gained much support in the world, Eban points out, The question of the holy places would have to be solved by some sort of extraterritorial arrangement. “We are committed to renounce jurisdiction over the holy areas,” he recalls. Together with then-ministers Menachem Beigin and Zerach Warhaftig, he drafted, soon after the Six-Day War, a letter to United Nations Secretary General U Thant informing him of the Cabinet decision to this effect.

On the Palestinian question, Eban endorses the “Yariv formula” which expressed willingness to negotiate with any Palestinian representation that recognize Israel, Under its present leadership, the PLO is unlikely to come to recognize Israel, and therefore Israel must continue to oppose a separate Palestinian state on the West Bank, as long as that is the case, Eban says firmly. This policy has gained acceptance, if not approval, internationally–as witness the Kremlin’s current attempts to persuade Yasir Arafat to accept Resolution 242 and thereby gain admittance to the Geneva conference.

The letter by the 78 Senators to President Ford encouraged him greatly, Eban says, adding though that personally he had never subscribed to the view that Israel’s support on Capitol Hill was being eroded. At the same time, he warns that “it would be wrong to see the letter as an endorsement of a hawkish territorial policy.” The letter, he says, should certainly not be seen as encouragement for immobility. Its signatories are “for a strong, robust Israel–but not for a greater Israel…”