The Cabinet’s decision to approve a new American initiative designed to promote talks between Israel and its neighbors on an “end-of-the-state-of-war” has met with some sharply critical reaction in Israel –from both “hawks and “doves.”
The “hawks,” predictably, spoke of a “sell-out of peace”–charging the government with whittling down Israel’s long-cherished demand for full contractual peace with the Arab states as the condition for any withdrawals. Since the withdrawals which many of the “hawks” envisage are not such as to induce the Arabs to agree to peace, Premier Yitzhak Rabin and his aides dismissed the criticism from this direction without much ado More disturbing, however, has been the criticism of such dyed-in-the-wool “doves” as former Foreign Minister Abba Eban.
Within the coalition’s ranks too there is a great deal of uncertainty–much of it as yet in the form of quiet rumbling rather than outspoken criticism–of the end-of-war decision. What worries many people is that the Rabin Cabinet has allowed itself to fall into the same tactical error which cost it so dearly–in terms of credibility and of real estate–less than a year ago in the interim agreement with Egypt. The history of the interim agreement is well remembered.
INTERIM ACCORD HISTORY
Rabin, back in Feb, 1975, publicly offered Egypt the Sinai passes and oil fields in return for an “end of belligerency.” After two “shuttles” by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and much diplomatic haggling. Egypt got the oil and the passes but Israel had to make do with much less than “end of belligerency” which, according to legal experts, is synonymous with “end of the state of war.”
Kissinger claimed, after the interim agreement was signed, that Israel had won some “elements of non-belligerency.” The Israeli government at the time tended to agree and put the best possible face on the deal.
This is not, of course, to say that the interim agreement was a bad thing. It has yet to be tested. But so far, it seems to have vindicated itself and Rabin, its most ardent advocate in the government Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s statement in Kuwait yesterday warning Syria not to drag Egypt into a war with Israel is probably the best and most convincing vindication of the interim agreement.
But almost all observers now agree that Israel was bested in the negotiating process and came off a good deal worse than Sadat who said at the outset he wanted the oil and the passes and finally achieved just that. Although Egypt does not control the strategic passes, Israel no longer does either and that precisely was Sadat’s immediate goal.
GRAVE TACTICAL BLUNDER
Rabin is now widely perceived to have made a grave tactical blunder in offering the passes and the oil–both tangible objects and demanding in return the vague and nebulous concept of “end of belligerency.”
What happened in effect was that Sadat immediately “pocketed” the oil and the passes and all the subsequent negotiating centered on the concept of end of belligerency, with Israel trying to inject as much meaning into it as possible, and Egypt trying to limit its meaning as much as possible. The vital symmetry of the negotiation had been lost by the Israeli Premier’s opening offer.
Instead of negotiations over two linked variables–Egypt’s concession and Israel’s concession–they concerned only one variable–Egypt’s concession. Israel’s concession, the oil and the passes, were “taken for granted” –considered as a fixed proposition rather than as a second variable lending the negotiation its essential symmetry. This was because of the vague and uncertain definition of “end of belligerency.”
It was as though Israel had offered a finite object (oil and passes) and asked in return for “a lot of money.” Obviously the subsequent haggling focussed solely on what was meant by “a lot of money.”
The very same danger looms again, the critics say, with the revival of “end of belligerency” as a Middle East diplomatic goal. Government officials counter that the Cabinet, aware of this danger, deliberately refrained this time from discussing any “territorial details” at this stage, But this is surely naivete, say the critics, Israel last year offered Egypt two-thirds of Sinai in return for an end of belligerency pact, but Egypt refused. Authoritative Israeli sources said this week that the offer still stands and Sadat most certainly has not forgotten it.
COMPOUNDING A BAD SITUATION
The danger, then, is that Sadat will again “pocket” the implied concession–two-thirds of Sinai–and the subsequent negotiation will again focus solely on the Egyptian quid-pro-quo–end-of-war–which Sadat will seek to confine and restrict to the minimum possible meaning.
Israel, critics say, has enabled this situation to arise by announcing its agreement to an end-of-war probe without at the same time announcing, in the clearest possible terms, what it understands by end-of-war and what it would therefore expect to get from Egypt under this heading.
Had Israel set out its demands as clearly as it has set out its implied territorial offer, the negotiation could proceed on a symmetrical basis with each side’s concession linked to the other’s in direct proportion. If Egypt rejected, say, half of the Israeli demands under “end-of-war”then Israel would halve its own territorial offer.
But Israel has made no specific demands, It has given everyone to understand that “end-of-war” is an uncertain concept requiring the elaboration of legal experts: In this way, the critics fear, Israel has again in effect invited erosion of its demand from Egypt. while drawing the focus of future negotiations away from Egypt’s territorial demands of Israel.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
