News Brief

manently required; but judging from the fact that the force which has recently proved capable of suppressing a disorder already in full blaze throughout the whole of the country numbered, according to newspaper reports, not more than 7,000 all told, it may be assumed that, for preventive purposes, less than a half of that total would be sufficient.

7. JEWISH UNITS IN THE GARRISON

The following suggestions are not to be read as implying any distrust of the British soldiers. Yet the psychological side of the problem should not be disregarded. A British youth, stationed on guard duty in a country where the Jews are supposed to play the role of pioneers, cannot help despising that strange species of pioneer who expects soldiers or another race to protect him. He knows enough of the history of Anglo-Saxon colonization and pioneering to look at such people, with a mixture of sarcasm and contempt. It would be most unwise to allow that sentiment to take root and develop. No observer who knew the spirit of the British army in Palestine in 1920 and 1921 will deny that the attitude of the average soldier towards the Jew was distinctly unfriendly and scornful; and this at a time when the Chalutzim in the “Emek” (the Valley of Esdraclon) were accomplishing feats of courage and self-sacrifice really worthy of respect. Unless we assume an inborn anti-Semitism in the average young Britisher which we refuse to do, the only reasonable explanation of this feeling can be found in the fact that here was a race presuming to play at nation-building while others had to look after its safety. The disbandment of the Jewish battalions, practically completed early in 1920 (in April there were only 400 Jewish soldiers left at Sarafend) seemed to justify this impression.

We earnestly insist that all this should be taken into consideration. What Lord Balfour described in one of his speeches as “partnership” between the British and the Jewish people is mainly based on a moral foundation; it cannot be maintained if one of the “partners” has no respect for the others. It would be useless to contend that protection does not necessarily involve contempt; this might be true in the case of other peoples, but the British are essentially a virile race, and the position of the Jewish settlers, of whom almost the half are ablebodied men who yet “want” to be protected, cannot but strike them as unmanly.

What has been said of the attitude of the British soldier in Palestine applies equally to the whole British nation. It was sufficient to follow the British press during the recent disorders to gain the impression that the public of this country, who have heard so much of the exploits of Jewish pioneers in Palestine, can simply not understand why these people proclaimed to be so gallant, should shrink from ensuring their own security. From a serious paper like the “New Statesman” down to Hyde Park hecklers, the main question has been: why don’t the Jews offer to police the country themselves? As a matter of fact the Jews did offer it. In the winter of 1921-22 the Zionist Executive submitted to H. M.’s Government a considered proposal to reestablish the Jewish battalions, offering also to contribute large yearly sums towards their upkeep: but the offer was declined. Immediately the first news of the recent outbreak in Palestine reached the various centers of the Diaspora, innumerable mass meetings voiced the demand that England should allow the Jews to form a Palestine garrison. Thousands of young Jews in Canada, United States, Argentine, Poland and other countries have already offered themselves for service in Palestine. There is no doubt that the Zionist movement would unanimously and enthusiastically welcome an opportunity for the re-establishment of the Jewish Legion.

There is hardly need to explain that this offer does not mean the creation of “Jewish” troops in the sense of a separate command. From the very beginning of the Jewish Legion movement, as early as 1914, no such ambition was ever entertained. The Palestine garrison should be a British garrison, consisting of units subject to the British military command in the usual way. What is here suggested is that some of these units should consist of Jews, exactly as in the case of the Judean Battalion (38th, 39th and 40th Royal Fusiliers) during the war and the immediate post-war period.

It might be suggested, further, that such units should be recruited not exclusively in Palestine. A recruiting office could be established also, in England, and Jews desirous of enlisting might be required to proceed to England first. We can fully guarantee that there would be many thousands ready to answer the call at their own expense.

8. THE QUESTION OF EXPENDITURE

We fully realize the weight of the question as to by whom and in what proportion the expense involved in the re-establishment of Jewish units should be borne.

The following suggestions might be found to go some way towards finding a fair solution.

First, the Jewish units could be organized on considerably less expensive lines than those now adopted in the British army. The standard accepted for the Transjordan Frontier Force might serve as point de depart. Being in constant touch with a movement of Jewish youth extending over several countries, we feel authorized to affirm that, despite the material privation which those standards imply for Eu