The following is the complete text of a Memorandum on the Defence of Palestine with particular reference to a plan for Jewish participation in the defence force, submitted to every member of Parliament by the World Zionist Revisionists:
1. REORGANIZATION OF THE POLICE
There can obviously be no absolute rule as to the “nationality” of individual policemen to be employed in this or that case, first of all because often there are more than one person to be interrogated or arrested, and among them there may be both Jews and Arabs. Yet, on the whole, for reasons which need no explaining after the recent outbreak, the guiding principle should be that Jewish policemen only should be employed, as far as possible, in Jewish settlements and also—this is of the greatest importance—in neighborhoods of cities having a mixed Jewish-Arab population. Neglect of this principle can but lead to eternal suspicion, recrimination and ultimately to a feeling of mutual antipathy between individual inhabitants of one race and individual policemen of the other. Very essential, moreover, is the question of the language to be used by the police in interrogating a person, taking down his evidence in writing, and making him sign the evidence. There have been many cases where Jews felt reluctant about putting their signatures to an Arabic manuscript which purported to represent their evidence, but which they could not read.
The acceptance of the principle here advocated naturally implies a considerable increase in the number of Jewish policemen. The Government may rest assured that it will now be able to find any number of Jews willing to join the Palestine Police Force, young men of good physique and of moral and intellectual qualifications far above the average. Yet there is one condition, the disregard of which would inevitably lead to failure. This condition is: that Jewish policemen should be treated and trained as separate units, with due regard for the Hebrew language, and, so far as compatible with service duties, for Jewish holidays. It can be affirmed with the utmost conviction, based upon the experience of many years, that without this condition the results would be most unsatisfactory. Just the best sort of Jewish young men would avoid enlisting, or, if enlisted, very soon begin to leave the service, and their discontented attitude while in service would create among their superior officers the general impression that Jews are unfit for police duty. It must be borne in mind that the young Jew described above as the “best sort” for police employment is usually a Zionist and a man of certain intellectual and educational standing: he is quite prepared, as he has shown on many occasions, to lead a life of rough work and material privation, but he wants to live in a Jewish milieu and in a congenial environment. This is, after all, what he came to Palestine for. It does not imply, on his part, any general antipathy towards the Arabs if he does not feel happy among people whose habits and outlook are so different from his own.
2. A REORGANIZATION OF POLICE DOES NOT SOLVE THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE
The best police force in the world can deal successfully only with ordinary offenses, such as theft, or an occasional robbery or murder, but it cannot cope with a riot of such character as the recent one. Neither its numbers, its equipment, or its training, can be equal to such a purpose. Even in London, with its extremely complicated traffic conditions, which alone call for an exceptionally large number of constables on permanent duty, the total of the police force is about 25,000, which is about 1 per 300 inhabitants. Tel Aviv, a modern city, with 40,000 inhabitants, has less than 100 policemen. A Jewish settlement of some 400 souls cannot have more than 2 or 3 constables. It is evident that such a “force,” if force it can be called, would prove useless in a case of a serious attack, while—as the recent riots have shown—just these smaller settlements are likely to be attacked.
This point is too often overlooked in public discussions: laymen always speak of “reorganization of the police” as a means for prevention or suppression of serious outbreaks. It is to be hoped that the Government is aware of the distinction. While a reorganization of the Palestine Police Force is indeed necessary, it has very little to do with the question of protecting Jewish settlements and neighborhoods from concerted mass attacks.
3. SELF DEFENSE
The main deterrent to such attacks, and also the only instrument capable of suppressing them if started, is, of course, a military garrison; but before we come to this side of the problem, it should here be emphasized that a Jewish Self Defense cannot under any circumstances be dispensed with. There are today more than 100 Jewish settlements scattered throughout Palestine, and if the Mandate is to be carried out they will grow in number, and will probably penetrate into new districts. Detachments of a garrison can be stationed only at a few strategic points. A colony attacked would have to resist the first onset and wait for troops during a number of critical hours, quite a sufficient length of time for serious destruction of life and property, unless the inhabitants are in a position to defend themselves.
A very serious consideration, also, is the fact that telegraph wires may be cut by the attacking party: the Grand Mufti, in an interview published in the “Manchester Guardian” in September 1929, actually said that one of the ropeans, a call to join the Jewish units on such conditions would be answered by many thousands of volunteers—volunteers eligible not only from the viewpoint of their physique, but also from that of their moral and educational standard. The cost of the Transjordan Frontier Force (numbering 677 officers and men) in which are included three cavalry companies and a company of camelry, is £P140,058 (January 1st to December 31st, 1928) While it is not suggested that the same number would be sufficient in the case of Jewish units, nor that the same level of expenditure could, in their case be applied without any increase, the cost here quoted may safely be taken as not far removed from the standard required.
Secondly, we must emphatically submit that a large share of the expenditure should be borne by the Palestinian treasury. Since Palestine as a whole derives undeniable benefit from the constructive activities of the Jewish settler—activities not only permitted but specifically provided for by the Mandate—it is but fair that the country as a whole should pay for those defense forces which make such activities possible. Moreover, a very large part of the Palestine treasury’s income—as much as 40 per cent, according to Zionist calculation never contradicted by any authority—is derived from Jewish sources. It has been thought justifiable to impose upon the Palestine treasury very large contributions towards the upkeep of the Transjordan Defense Force, despite the fact that its service and use for the country west of the Jordan is more than questionable. We hope that this arrangement will soon prove to have been ephemeral. Nevertheless, it is a precedent which should be followed, this time with complete justification, in the case of troops necessary for Western Palestine itself.
As to the share to be borne by the British treasury, we deliberately abstain from expressing any opinion on this aspect of the problem. The coefficient of the British participation should correspond to the value which Palestine, and therefore its internal security, represent as an Imperial asset. It is not for us to discuss this subject which might be left to the judgment of British public opinion and the Imperial Government themselves.
On the other hand, should the Government find that also the Jewish “partner”—in other words, those institutions which support Zionist work in Palestine ought to be called upon to share in the expense of maintaining the Jewish units, there can be no doubt as to the answer; it would be an emphatic affirmative. As already recalled in this memorandum. the Zionist Executive, as early as 1921-22, submitted an offer implying a considerable financial contribution towards the upkeep of Jewish units in Palestine. While claiming no brief to speak on behalf of the present Executive of the Jewish Agency, we are sufficiently acquainted with the attitude of the Jewish masses throughout the world to affirm that Jewry, and Zionist Jewry in particular, is practically unanimous in its resolve to make every effort, be it in the provision of men or money, necessary for ensuring the safety of the Jewish population of Palestine.
In conclusion we wish to add a few words with which we should perhaps have prefaced this Memorandum. The whole question of the Mandate, and of the policy it implies, hinges mainly on the problem of defense. It is obvious that a process of colonization is likely to be objected to by the population on the spot, no matter what material benefits that population derives from the influx of new forces and capital; it is obvious that the objection is sometimes likely to take the form of violence; it is, to put it briefly, undeniable that hardly any one of the Zionist clauses of the Mandate can really be implemented, unless the Government has at its disposal a sufficient apparatus for the establishment of confidence and the preservation of order. No one suspects this or any other British Government of an intention to retain the Mandate without fulfilling its obligations. Determined as they are to continue as the Mandatory of Palestine, there is an obligation upon them to find an effective solution to the problem of defense. Since British public opinion evidently objects to shouldering, or at least to shouldering alone, the burden of Palestine defense, and with such remarkable unanimity, asks why the Jews should not assume the burden, or at least a share of it, the solution put forward in this Memorandum, will, we are confident, appeal to it as both fair and reasonable.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
