Informed Western sources appeared divided today over whether the sudden reduction of the Soviet presence in Egypt presaged an advancement toward a settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict or boded a greater threat toward a renewal of hostilities by Egypt. One diplomat told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that “This looks like (Egyptian President Anwar) Sadat has given up on Moscow and will look to the Americans for help to reopen the Suez and other things, which is all to the good.”
Another, however, cautioned: “Tell your people not to start dancing the Hors. There’s no telling what Sadat may do now because the Soviets held him back to avoid a military confrontation with the United States. They may not be in a position to tell Sadat to stop using his weapons against Israel if only to shore up his domestic position.”
Diplomats generally posed the question of “what do we really know of what is happening” between the Cairo and Moscow governments? They suggested a close watch on reaction from Moscow and Cairo, particularly domestic reaction in Egypt, to supply more definitive pointers that will signify the meaning of Sadat’s move. Moscow has already announced, through a Tass dispatch, that the Soviet withdrawals are by mutual consent. The announcement obviously was intended to put the best possible face on the development.
In their speculation here, knowledgeable sources were asking questions such as the number of Soviet personnel in Egypt–estimated at from 12,000-20,000–and how many of them are to leave; whether advisors, training personnel or combat troops are departing; whether Soviet naval base facilities are to be withdrawn, though they service and supply Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean; what arrangements may or may not have been made to continue the Soviet supply of spare parts and munitions for missiles, tanks, planes and other equipment? The Russians are believed to have invested from $5-$7 billion in Egyptian military capabilities.
How these latest developments will affect the psychological climate in Israel was also a subject of intense speculation here during the past two days. Observers are asking whether the lessening of Soviet forces in Egypt means that Israel will commensurably lose its fears of attack from across the Suez and therefore become less anxious and less dependent on military supplies from the US? Will Israel, therefore, be more amenable to withdrawal from part or most of the Egyptian territory it now occupies? The concensus of observers here is that “it is too early to tell.”
Observers seemed generally to agree, with some qualification, that the strong American military posture in the Mediterranean, the continuing supply of American weapons to Israel and the outspoken assurances to Israel by both President Nixon and his Democratic opponent, Sen. George McGovern, in this election year, had their effect on Sadat’s thinking.
The other aide of the coin, observers speculated, was the continued refusal of the Soviet government to provide offensive weapons in large quantities to Egypt in view of the Kremlin’s desire to avoid a showdown with the US, particularly in an election year, and the Soviet government’s prime desire to reach a detente in Western Europe and with the US.
Another factor speculated upon freely is the American success in persuading some Arab states to look to the US as a friendly power rather than a hostile one, despite its support for Israel. They refer to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the US and Yemen two weeks ago; Yemen was the first of the Arab countries that broke with the US at the time of the Six-Day War to resume ties. They note that Sudan, on the verge of diplomatic relations with Washington, and current American trade talks with Algeria are important factors effecting Cairo’s thinking.
What processes relating to the Middle East may have been put into motion as a result of the US-Soviet summit conference in Moscow in May are still unknown, at least publicly. But Cairo is doubtlessly aware that five years of association with the Soviet government has brought Egypt neither peace, a reopened Suez Canal or return of the Sinai. In this connection, some diplomats here observed that the closer the US government gets to the Arab countries, the more likely an “even-handed” US policy in the Middle East will emerge. They pointed out that the Nixon policy is still committed to the Security Council’s Resolution 242 of Nov. 22, 1967 as the basic framework for a Mideast settlement.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
