Behind the Headlines Syria Caught in Arab Vortex

The Syrians are dragging their feet on the way to a disengagement arrangement along Israel’s northern front. Many foreign observers seem to agree that this attitude stems mainly from a tactical consideration: the need for careful timing, questions of prestige and postures, and the deep rooted belief that the more trouble Syria gives to everybody else the more it stands to win.

These considerations no doubt play an important role in this context. But there is more to it than a deliberate manner of tough haggling. For this procrastination, coupled with occasional large-scale violations of the cease-fire, reflects the absence of a decision and not the implementation of one. According to reliable reports the Damascus policy is motivated–at least to some extent–by a widening split among Baath Party leaders and the Syrian military, a split which concerns future orientation involving complicated issues far beyond the immediate specific problem of disengagement.

The Syrians appear to be conscious of the fact that the decision they are about to make is going to have far reaching effects on the whole political position in the Arab world as well as on the structure of politics at home. The disengagement means revival of their uneasy wartime alliance with Egypt. The opposite–a continuous effort to deliberately warm up the Golan front–will ultimately ally Syria with Iraq and Libya.

CHANCE FOR MIDDLE ROAD ELIMINATED

In fact Syria faces a fateful, painful hour of truth. Either she joins Egypt for better or worse or she breaks with her. No middle road apparently exists anymore since President Anwar Sadat threw all his weight in favor of a quick Syrian disengagement. A clear-cut decision must be taken. Obviously the decision is not an easy one. Since independence Syria was always torn between the Fertile Crescent and the Nile Valley. Alliances with Iraq and Egypt both have numerous historical precedents. Both options always had their supporters, and the division persists today.

What is at stake, therefore, is not just whether to accept one disengagement formula or another. The real issue is with whom to cooperate; and the selection of partners will dictate the nature of Damascus’ line on disengagement. For example: If it is agreed upon that Egypt is preferable to Iraq as a future ally, disengagement becomes a must and what remains is just to make the best out of it. Yet for their part, the Egyptians made it quite embarrassing for President Hafez Assad to follow their footsteps. A series of Egyptian unilateral moves raised doubles in Syrian quarters whether Egypt wants a partner or merely a satellite.

There is serious tension now between Cairo and Damascus almost to the point of an open quarrel. But Assad did not dissociate himself in public from Sadat and he is probably unlikely to do so if things go his own way. Sadat treated Assad as junior partner. By concluding a separate disengagement agreement with Israel, Egypt, in fact, harmed Syria’s prospects of securing better terms for itself than it can hope to achieve now. This, at least, is what the Syrians are thinking. They believe that by tying together the two fronts to one disengagement package they would have been better off.

FEAR OF UPSETTING INTERNAL BALANCE

But it is too late now to turn the wheels back: Those Syrians preaching a switch into the Libya-Iraqi camp of extremists point to the Egyptian behavior as proof that Syria will be sacrificed by the big brother whenever it suits Sadat. Instead of being dragged by Sadat, they argue, Syria should embark upon an activist policy aimed at sabotaging Egyptian moves.

Assad, who already turned down the Iraqi courting, played for time at first. He did this by clamping total silence on news media in Syria concerning this sensitive issue. He drafted tough conditions for handing over the Israeli POW list and put forward even tougher proposals for the actual disengagement. Through this combination of toughness, procrastination and occasional shooting, Assad not only gained precious time to calm down hot heads at home, but compelled Sadat “to beg” in public for disengagement by Syria and secured an Egyptian commitment not to go it alone in the future.

But the time for real bargaining has come, and Assad has to talk business. This is the point at which things stand right now. Sadat tried to make it easier for Assad by convening an Arab mini-summit. Such a summit would guarantee wide Arab legitimization of a Syrian move to disengage. However, recent statements in Damascus indicate that by no means does Assad contemplate any dramatic departure from his present position. The most to be expected from him is a slow process of inching closer and closer to Egypt by gradual modification of Syria’s unacceptable terms for disengagement.

What is in store for Israel, therefore, are long negotiations with intermittent crises and military flare-ups. Assad simply will not be prepared to act at Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger’s pace for fear of upsetting the internal balance in Syria between the “Iraqi” and “Egyptian” factions.