The joint statement by President Ford and King Hussein of Jordan promising early American-Jordanian consultations toward an Israeli-Jordanian disengagement agreement came as something of a surprise to Israel. The Israeli government, it was reliably learned, was not told in advance that the United States-Jordanian communique issued in Washington yesterday would refer to the disengagement idea, especially not in favorable terms.
In addition. Foreign Minister Yigal Allon left Washington two weeks ago convinced that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger would dissuade Hussein from the disengagement idea which the Israeli government had rejected.
The communique issued by Ford and Hussein at the end of Hussein’s three-day visit to Washington noted that a “constructive contribution” had been made in the consultations toward the next stage in the Middle East peace negotiations and declared that consultations between Washington and Amman “will continue with a view to addressing at an appropriately early date the issues of particular concern to Jordan, including a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement agreement.”
Israel responded promptly to the communique last night with Foreign Ministry spokesman Gideon Saguy declaring in an official statement that the communique had “not changed Israeli policy,” which is to reject Jordan’s demand for an Israeli pullback from the Jordan River. “Israel is ready, as it has repeatedly stated, to strive for peace with Jordan,” Saguy’s statement said. “But Israel has rejected and continues to reject the Jordanian demand for an Israeli withdrawal along the Jordan River in the context of what the Jordanian government calls ‘a disengagement agreement.'”
NOT A MOVE AGAINST ISRAEL
However, well placed sources here maintained today that the Ford-Hussein communique was not to be seen chiefly as a move against Israel but rather as an American effort to bolster Hussein in the Arab world with which he is at loggerheads over the question of Palestinian representation.
Washington, Amman and Jerusalem all share an overwhelming preference for the King over the Palestine Liberation Organization as the arbiter of the future of the West Bank and of its Palestinian inhabitants. The communique, it is thought here, provided Hussein with just the kind of political clout he needed at this juncture.
The sources further noted that the communique did not expressly endorse Jordan’s position on a disengagement but merely referred to it in the context of the need for future negotiations. At the same time, no one here is denying that the communique jarred Jerusalem. A prompt reply was required, it was felt, both to give notice to the new U.S. President and his Arab guests, and to assure the public at home, that the government’s position on a West Bank interim agreement has not changed or weakened.
Israel had suggested a “functional disengagement” whereby Jordan would re-assume civilian administration of much of the West Bank without Israeli troops being withdrawn from any part of it. Hussein rejected this notion as an insult.
INTENDED TO PREEMPT CRITICISM OF ALLON
Informed observers here saw the Israeli statement as intended, too, to preempt any criticism of Allon in the light of the U.S.-Jordan communique. Allon has already been taken to task by columnists and opposition politicians for saying too much in Washington, for presenting his “private views” such as the “Allon Plan” and thereby creating the impression that the government as a whole was prepared to be more flexible than it is in fact.
Allon himself has denied the accusations–though he has not denied that he examined “various scenarios” with Kissinger, nor that he discussed the “Allon Plan,” stressing always that it had not been adopted as Cabinet policy. The Allon visit and its immediate aftermath, moreover, raised much uncertainty here as to whether Israel was prepared to consider a partial settlement with Jordan. Only a month ago top ranking officials were asserting that if there was to be a negotiation with Jordan it would have to be over a final settlement.
Allon himself maintains that he stressed to Kissinger that Premier Yitzhak Rabin’s government wanted to go to the electorate–as it has solemnly pledged–only with a final, overall territorial settlement and not with a partial plan which would only postpone the final decision for another date.
Nevertheless, reports from Washington during his visit and from well placed sources here on his return indicated that Kissinger virtually ruled out the practicability of an overall settlement at this time and sought to press towards a partial accord–and that Allon seemed to respond positively to this.
The uncertainty thereby engendered weakened Allon internally, especially since the Cabinet debate last month on the Palestinian question seemed to show up slight differences between him and Rabin on the West Bank question. The Israel statement last night was designed in part to strengthen Allon and to counter any idea that he had wavered or performed weakly during his talks in Washington.
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