Behind the Headlines Search for Suitable Explanations

Few here, if any, can explain what brought Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the decision to break off the talks in Jerusalem. The argument that Sadat found no common denominators between the Egyptian position and the Israeli one seems weak for several reasons: American testimony that there was considerable progress in the talks, the surprise with which the decision caught the Egyptian delegation itself, and the timing of the decision.

Questions posed here today were: how could Sadat decide there was nothing else to discuss even before the talks, which had started Tuesday, concluded a second day? Or to take another dimension of time–did Sadat really believe he would make more progress in two months of negotiations?

It took Egypt 30 years to “accept” Israel. Egypt could hardly have expected Israel to change its security frame of mind within two months, even if it can be granted that the Egyptian leader has a “different” approach to political negotiations from that of his Israeli counterpart.

Thus, analysts are saying, the way to try and understand the Egyptian move is–for the time being–to judge it by its immediate implications: the initiative which began exactly two months ago with Sadat’s bold visit to Jerusalem came to a standstill. The initiative which began with a drama was interrupted with a drama.

AN IMMEDIATE LESSON

The immediate lesson to be learned, it is noted, is that Sadat means what he says. When he told the Jerusalem Post last Friday: “Let the committee convene first, and then I will have my say,” he had probably known that he was sending the delegation to Jerusalem with good prospects that he would call it back shortly after.

Sadat apparently expects fast results. The fast Israeli offer on Sinai (too fast for the taste of many Israelis) was not fast enough according to Sadat’s taste, or, rather, it was simply not enough. Sadat says he needs more, and in order to clarify the seriousness of his demand he did not hesitate to break off the talks.

This does not mean, of course, that Israel must play it according to the Egyptian tune. It does mean that Israel should “play it cool,” to use the words of Premier Menachem Begin in his speech yesterday before the French Jewish delegation. Israel is not negotiating with Henry Kissinger, but with an impatient Sadat.

Hearing the speeches of Begin at the gala dinner Tuesday where he rebuked Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Kaamel, at a meeting yesterday morning with the Egyptian editors and at a meeting with the French Jewish delegation last evening, observers are wondering whether the Israeli leader is sufficiently aware of the psychology of Sadat.

This brings the discussion to the long term implication of the present crisis. Israel is currently negotiating essentially with one person. At his mercy, there is a visit to Jerusalem. At his mercy, there is also an exodus from Jerusalem. The degree of one-man rule was best expressed in the fact that Sadat’s own Foreign Minister was apparently surprised at the sudden voyage home. Where else in the world would a Foreign Minister be suddenly called home in the very middle of negotiations?

THE DILEMMA FOR ISRAEL

This, of course, analysts claim, explains the Israeli dilemma: how much can it give Egypt just because Sadat claims to have a sincere desire for peace? Israel, unfortunately, must be much more selective in her peace moves than Egypt. When Begin took the bold step to suggest an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, he faced an unprecedented opposition, even within his own Herut stronghold.

Although the Americans were reportedly unhappy about Sadat’s move to recall his delegation, Sadat apparently knows that the deliberate crisis would not push the Americans toward the Israeli view on the Palestinian problem. The only possible effect on the Americans may indeed be greater U.S. pressure on Israel to soften its position on the Palestinian problem and on the Israeli settlements in Sinai.

This, observers note, despite Begin’s statement before the French Jews, that he could not envisage American pressures following initial U.S. positive reaction to the Israeli peace plan. It was therefore largely up to the Americans to get the parties out of the present stalemate. It is in this context that Israelis see Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s visit to Cairo tomorrow where the key to continued negotiations lies.

Sadat launched his peace initiative last November because he had hardly anything to lose, and everything to gain. The same applies to the present crisis. From a bird’s eye view the entire Sadat initiative appears to be a well planned drama an impressive first act, leading to “problems” in the second act (Ismailia) and a crisis in the third act. However, the worldwide audience does not know just how many acts are still ahead and what kind of an end the author has designed.