JERUSALEM (Nov. 9)
As Israel looks ahead to the post-Arafat era, the government is considering a series of policy options: In the short term, easing conditions in the Palestinian territories to help a new leadership consolidate power and, in the longer term, restarting peace talks based on the “road map” plan. But there also are contingency plans for a far more pessimistic scenario: the possibility that the new Palestinian leaders may fail to assert their authority and that the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip could degenerate into chaos and internecine violence.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon laid down the general outlines of the new policy in a string of meetings last week with Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon and other senior defense establishment officials.
Sharon made two key decisions. Israel will do whatever it can from a distance to help Mahmoud Abbas, who seems to be emerging as the dominant figure in the new Palestinian leadership, to establish his position, but at the same time it will prepare for chaos if the broad coalition Abbas is forming falls apart.
Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom highlighted the delicate nature of Israel’s position with regard to the new Palestinian leaders.
“Any name we mention,” he said, “will be stigmatized as a collaborator. But we expect whatever leadership that emerges to be more moderate and more responsible.”
For the time being, Israeli hopes rest on Abbas. He has come out strongly against Palestinian terrorism and in favor of the political, economic and security reforms the Palestinians committed to under the internationally backed road map.
Position papers produced by the Foreign Ministry and IDF suggest Israel made two cardinal errors the last time Abbas held a share of power, when he served as Palestinian Authority prime minister between late April and early September 2003: It embraced him too tightly while failing to make some concessions, like large-scale prisoner releases, that Palestinians expected Abbas to achieve.
These are mistakes the Israeli establishment says it does not intend to repeat.
Proposed moves to help the new Palestinian leadership win popular backing can be divided into two areas — military and civilian. A Foreign Ministry paper urges the IDF to go into “defensive mode” and not launch pre-emptive strikes against terrorist organizations, and the defense establishment seems to be adopting the advice.
The IDF plans to cut offensive “seek-and-destroy” operations to a minimum and to focus on intercepting terrorists on their way to attack. The hope is that, if Palestinian factions also display moderation, it could reduce the level of violence in the territories, improve the quality of Palestinian life and so enhance Palestinian support for the new leadership.
Other planned moves are aimed directly at improving civilian life: for example, further easing restrictions on Palestinian movement and encouraging economic activity.
Another goodwill gesture will be to allow Yasser Arafat to be buried in pomp and circumstance, with a full complement of foreign dignitaries in attendance. A special air corridor will be opened to allow Arab leaders technically at war with Israel, such as Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi, to fly directly to the funeral without passing through Israeli border controls.
However, there could be a serious confrontation over where Arafat will be buried. Sharon is adamant that the P.A. president not be interred in Jerusalem, and Palestinian officials in recent days have spoken of burying Arafat in Ramallah instead. If the Palestinians insist on Jerusalem, it could cause serious tension.
Abbas has been trying to establish a broad coalition of all Palestinian factions, including the radical fundamentalist Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The key question is whether the radicals will agree to a cease-fire with Israel, or whether the coalition will break up over this or other conciliatory moves.
Israel is taking into account the possibility of open warfare between Palestinian factions, and might even target the radicals if that occurs.
If, however, Abbas is able to establish his position and makes progress toward a general cease-fire and reforms, Israel will consider reciprocal steps such as releasing prisoners.
There also would be an Israeli effort to coordinate the withdrawal from Gaza and part of the West Bank, as outlined in Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan, with the new Palestinian leadership.
If all goes smoothly, the next move would be to restart political negotiations based on the road map. This would jibe with European efforts to jump-start stalled peace talks, and get the new American administration to join them in playing a more active role.
The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, is said to be working on a “street map” that would lead the parties to the road map, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair is planning to invite all the relevant parties to an international conference in London to get a peace process restarted.
“We may be starting to get out of the nightmare,” one upbeat Foreign Ministry official, who insisted on anonymity, told JTA. “We have a historic” disengagement “plan in place, a new American administration and Arafat out of the picture. There is a huge opportunity here.”
But some Israeli analysts who know the Palestinian scene well suggest that the government is being far too optimistic, and that Abbas won’t have the clout to make the compromises necessary for peace.
Menachem Klein, a specialist in Palestinian studies at Bar Ilan University, maintains that a relatively weak Abbas leadership will prove to be only a transitional episode, and that Israel soon will have to deal with a new generation of local Palestinian leaders who have far more grass-roots support — people like Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti, who currently is in an Israeli jail on terrorism charges.
“They are the people who led the previous intifada in the late 1980s, and they are behind the Tanzim today,” he says, referring to the mainstream Fatah movement’s terrorist militia. “They are not a bunch of collaborators.”
In Klein’s view, the young lions would make peace with Israel only on terms similar to those acceptable to Arafat. Though Arafat never spelled out his conditions for peace, they are believed to include Arab control over eastern Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, a full Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders and a “right of return” to Israel for millions of Palestinian refugees and their descendants, conditions no Israeli leader would accept.
“Otherwise they will say, ‘we will fight on,’ ” Klein warns.