Background Report the Atherton Shuttle

As America’s roving Mideast envoy, Alfred L. Atherton prepared to return to Cairo on the second round of his shuttle diplomacy. The progress of his mission did not appear particularly encouraging.

Atherton told newsmen today that he did not propose to characterize each conversation in terms of progress achieved or not achieved, but it seemed clear enough that, were he to characterize them despite himself, he would have to admit that not much progress has been made so far on this week-old shuttle.

Israeli sources insist that Egypt has substantially hardened its previous positions and is now demanding totally uncompromising formulations and rejecting the vaguer and more ambiguous drafts that it had earlier indicated acceptance of.

Thus, whereas back in January, just before the abortive Jerusalem talks broke off, the Egyptians indicated they would make do with a resolution 242-type ambiguity on the withdrawal question, and with President Carter’s “Aswan formula” on the Palestinian issue, President Anwar Sadat was not saying that either of these would be good enough. However, he was pressing for a specific undertaking of withdrawal from all the occupied areas and had revived Egypt’s initial insistence on specific recognition of the Palestinians rights to self-determination.

According to these same Israeli sources, Israel for its part, had significantly softened its own position last week, relative to its stand at the start of the first Atherton shuttle that followed the talks’ break off. This week, the sources said, Israel responded to the hardline Egyptian draft by merely signifying which parts of it could be a basis for negotiation and which were thoroughly unacceptable.

PLOYS AND COUNTER-PLOYS

The sources said the Egyptian hardening could be traced to Sadat’s inter-Arab problems and his resolve, because of these problems, to insist on Jordan’s entry into the peace process. Sadat was making it unequivocally clear that he would not resume the talks without Jordan physically present.

Jordan, for its part, is putting up stringent textual conditions, relating to West Bank withdrawal and the Palestinian question, before it would be prepared to consider joining the peace process.

Diehard optimists here say they believe Sadat’s ostensible insistence on Jordanian participation is merely a tactical ploy, designed to up the ante, and that in the final analysis he would be prepared to go on negotiating alone provided he could first achieve a “declaration of principles” which, even though vague and ambivalent, gave him some rhetorical cover for his Palestinian flank.

But there are pessimists within the government who take the Egyptian President very much at his word–and the Hashemite King at his–and therefore conclude that the chances of progress are indeed bleak.

In this context it might be significant to mention Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan’s remark Sunday night, at a dinner for British Foreign Secretary David Owen, that if the sides failed to agree on a “declaration of principles,” efforts would have to be made “to reach peace through other means.” Aides said the Minister was probably referring to the possibility–always in the background–of an interim accord that would be much less than peace but would keep the hope of ultimate peace still alive.

U.S. MAY PROPOSE COMPROMISE

At any rate, the search for the saving formula for a “declaration of principles” is certainly not over yet–if only because Washington has patently not given up hope of achieving it.

Atherton, it is believed, will keep shuttling for the next two weeks or so, whether or not any tangible progress is made, in order to keep up the momentum in preparation for the visit to Washington in mid-March by Premier Menachem Begin, Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman. There President Carter himself is likely to move into the act, possibly even submitting to the Israeli leaders, with the full authority and prestige of the U.S. Presidency, an American compromise formula for a “declaration of principles.” If this were on the lines of the “Aswan formula,” which it very probably would be, Begin and company would be very hard put to reject it.

Aswan, after all, did not endorse a Palestinian state nor even “self-determination.” It spoke of Palestinians participating in the determination of their own future, which Israel has indicated it could live with, and of “legitimate rights,” which Israel says is awkward. But Israel’s position in American opinion would itself be awkward were it to endanger the entire peace process over such an ostensibly textual issue.