Behind the Headlines Ambivalence over the Talks Deadlock

Government circles here have evinced two distinct reactions to the hardening fact of deadlock in the Israel-Egypt peace negotiations. Some officials express deep disappointment. They say they did–and still do–believe in Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s basic sincerity in the quest for peace. But events have proven, they add, that he means peace on unacceptable terms.

Others tend to say “we told you so,” recalling their scepticism throughout these past nine months regarding Egypt’s earnestness or regarding the objective chances of reconciling the two sides’ conflicting positions on basic issues.

The sceptics themselves divide into two groups–those who outright refused to believe that Egypt wanted peace, and always accused Sadat of seeking to trick Israel and the world, and those who left the “sincerity” question open, but believed that Sadat never intended to veer from his tough terms and sought all along to push Israel into disfavor with U.S. public and governmental opinion.

SERIES OF EVENTS PINPOINTED

The sceptics, of both hues, look back over the months of negotiations for events to back up their interpretation. They argue that whenever a breakthrough seemed imminent, Egypt suddenly toughened its stance and thwarted the hope of progress. They catalogue these events as follows:

Early on, Sadat and Premier Menachem Begin reportedly agreed that the vast bulk of Sinai would be demilitarized. But a few days later Egypt’s War Minister Mahammed Gamassy stated that his army would advance to within a few kilometers of the international border–well beyond the Giddi and Mitle Passes which Begin had understood would be the line of effective demilitarization. (Since then this issue has remained unclear.)

At Ismailya last Christmas, the two sides were within a whisker of agreement on a declaration of principles–when suddenly the Egyptians backed away.

The Jerusalem conference in January looked particularly promising. Within hours the two sides again seemed advancing towards agreement on a declaration of principles–when suddenly orders came through from Sadat recalling his delegations. Israeli sources say they know that Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Kaamel and his team reported back to Cairo–before the cutoff order–on the progress that had been achieved.

On March 30, Sadat told Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and Attorney General Aharon Barak that he would be prepared for an Israeli Defense Force strategic presence and for some Israeli settlements to remain on the West Bank. But the next morning, Gamassy told Weizman to disregard that statement. (Sadat has subsequently repeated it to Labor Party chairman Shimon Peres, Weizman and others–but never formally or officially.)

Egypt’s initial position on President Carter’s “Aswan formula” of Jan. 4 was favorable–but subsequently an erosion set in. (These Israeli sources contend that Israel never outrightly rejected Aswan as the basis for a statement of principles–a contention which other observers here dispute.)

Sadat’s indications to Peres and Weizman in Salzburg, Austria last month, that he would be flexible regarding an IDF presence on the West Bank and also would not demand an independent Palestinian state were not repeated formally by Kaamel at the Leeds Castle conference with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance a week later.

Finally, last week’s extreme stiffening of the Egyptian position, with Sadat, Kaamel and others saying publicly and in private that Egypt will not rejoin the talks unless Israel announces in advance that it has no territorial claims on the occupied areas.

SAUDI ARABIAN PRESSURE SEEN

This final–and apparently critical–hardening of stance is being attributed by Israeli sources in part on Saudi Arabian pressure upon Egypt to regard the peace initiative as effectively dead and to realign with Syria and Jordan. This assessment has apparently been corroborated by U.S. special envoy Alfred Atherton’s reports last week on his talks in Riyadh, Cairo and Alexandria.

But Israeli sources fault the U.S. government for not seeking to exert its own influence upon the Saudis to moderate their position. Israeli officials recall ruefully the arguments they advanced (unsuccessfully) against the U.S. planes sale to Saudi Arabia, when they contended that far from moderating the Saudis the planes woule encourage their burgeoning extremism.