Behind the Headlines Bevin’s Cabinet Papers Published

A month before announcing publicly in 1947 that Britain would put the question of Palestine in the hands of the United Nations, Ernest Bevin, the foreign Secretary, told Cabinet colleagues that he favored a Palestinian state predominantly under Arab control and apposed the creation of an independent Jewish State. Bevin’s preferences were revealed in Cabinet papers published this week under the rule which removes them from the secret list after 30 years.

Bevin’s anti-Zionist policies are spelled out in a memorandum dated Jan. 16, 1947, saying that the partition of Palestine would be a “desperate remedy.” He favored self-governing Jewish cantons in a mainly Arab-ruled Palestine.

However, Bevin’s anti-Zionist stance was bitterly criticized by Arthur Creech-Jones, the Colonial Secretary, as “a gross betrayal of the Jews.” He asserted that the Jews would “accept no solution which denies their claim for statehood.”

Creech-Jones was no doubt referring to the Labor Party’s traditional support for Zionist aspirations, re-stated only a year before at the party’s national conference which proposed that Arabs should be encouraged to leave Palestine as Jewish immigrants moved in.

BASIS FOR PRO-ARAB POSITION

The pro-Arab position of Bevin and others was based on their perceptions of Britain’s national interest. A memorandum submitted by Bevin, together with Emanuel Shinwell, Minister of Fuel, acknowledged Britain’s growing dependence on Middle East oil and emphasized the risks to Britain in offending the Arabs and in encouraging Jewish settlement and a Jewish State.

The hostility of the Arabs, the Bevin-Shinwell memorandum said, could lead to the removal of British influence from the entire Moslem area lying between Greece and India. “This would not only have strategic consequences. It would also jeopardize the security of our interest and the increasingly important oil production in the Middle East.”

The importance of Palestine for Britain’s security was stressed by Field Marshall Montgomery, the Army Chief of Staff, and his Naval and RAF colleagues. They told Prime Minister Clement Atlee that Palestine was “of special importance.” In war, “Egypt would be our key position in the Middle East and it was necessary that we should hold Palestine as a screen for the defense of Egypt, they said.

While the defense chiefs foresaw Britain retaining positions in Palestine whatever political solution was arrived at in the country, Bevin and Creech-Jones somberly concluded that it was “impossible to arrive at a peaceful settlement in Palestine on any basis whatsoever.”

It would be “humiliating” for Britain simply to withdraw leaving no settlement behind them, they said. However, they feared there would be a breakdown of discipline among British troops “if provocation by the Jewish terrorists continues.” These discussions on Palestine took place against the background of on economic crisis in Britain itself which contributed to the eventual decision to withdraw.