Behind the Headlines Israeli Move Expected Before Ford Begins His Summitry in June

Seasoned observers here are convinced that Israel will make some new political initiative or overture to Egypt before President Ford’s meetings with President Anwar Sadat and Premier Yitzhak Rabin next month despite vehement and insistent denials from official sources that any such move is contemplated.

The observers base their belief on certain signs and hints that have emerged in recent weeks and on the fact that, with Ford having placed his personal prestige on the line in a renewed U.S. effort to achieve some sort of interim accord between Israel and Egypt before the Geneva conference reconvenes, it is incumbent on Israel to create as promising a basis as possible for the success of the American initiative.

Official sources maintain that Israel will make no new moves before it knows the results of the U.S. policy reassessment in the Middle East ordered by Ford following the suspension of the bilateral talks conducted by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in March; and before Rabin has his meetings with Ford and Kissinger in Washington June 11-12.

The official sources point out that the Cabinet will hold a full dress “political debate” just before Rabin leaves for Washington and insist that the government can make no new moves before that debate is held.

‘UNILATERAL GESTURE’ MAY BE OFFERED

But knowledgeable observers remain unconvinced, They believe that new Israeli overtures in one or two possible directions could come before the Ford-Sadat-Rabin talks and before the reassessment is completed. These could be, they say, a “unilateral gesture” of a military nature in Sinai coinciding with the reopening of the Suez Canal which is scheduled for June 5; new proposals for a partial settlement with Egypt to be advanced to the U.S. before Ford’s meetings with Sadat and Rabin; or a combination of both.

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency has learned from highly placed sources that the possibility of a unilateral Israeli gesture on the Suez front has already figured in top level policy-making discussions. Although officials vigorously deny this, Defense Minister Shimon Peres seemed to lend it some credence Monday when he told a closed meeting of United Jewish Appeal leaders that Israel would “do its best to ensure the smooth running of the Suez Canal” if Sadat keeps his promise to reopen the waterway.

The reversion of the canal from a military barrier (former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan once called it the world’s best tank trap) to an artery of peaceful commerce would be viewed in Israel as a retreat by Sadat from the option of war. Peres’ statement followed a recent report in the Cairo magazine Ros el-Yussuff, that Israel has already hinted to the U.S. that it would undertake a limited unilateral pull-back as a gesture to coincide with the reopening of the canal.

According to some reports from Washington, the idea was circulating in the U.S. capital and was welcomed there with great enthusiasm. It was considered likely to regain for Israel some of the sympathy it lost in official Washington circles following the suspension of the Kissinger talks last March 22 and to create a better climate for a renewed attempt at partial settlement talks.

PUSH FOR NEW IDEAS

Notwithstanding the official denials, observers here believe Israeli policy-makers feel that they must produce new ideas that Ford could discuss with Sadat in Salzburg on June 1 because the Americans are resuming their peace initiatives clearly on the assumption that both sides would be forthcoming with new ideas. On the other hand, if only for domestic political reasons, the Rabin government cannot go far beyond the position it took when the Kissinger talks collapsed–a position endorsed by the Knesset, including the Likud opposition.

Observers believe, therefore, that the new Israeli proposals would be based on the “limited” scenario discussed during the dying days of the Kissinger shuttle mission. It is accepted here that Egypt will not retract its refusal to offer a formal statement of non-belligerency for anything less than a full, final Mideast peace settlement.

Therefore, the “limited” Israeli proposal offering a smaller territorial pull-back for a less definitive political commitment from Egypt seems to be the only promising course. Israel itself will not soften its demand for an undertaking of non-belligerency as the only acceptable quid pro quo for a major pull-back that would include the Mitle and Gidi Passes and the Abu Rodeis oil fields.

In the context of a “limited” scenario, it is believed that Israel would have room to suggest alternative arrangements on the ground that could furnish the basis for further negotiations–presuming a willingness on all sides to reach a settlement.