Behind the Headlines Power Struggle Developing Among Arab States on Dealing with Israel

For the first time since the Yom Kippur war, a serious power struggle has developed among the Arab states. There even some indications of the formation of new blocs and groupings, different in both composition and common denomination, from those in the near, prewar past.

The spark which relighted the inter-Arab controversy was the Sadat-Hussein agreement announced on July 18. There were two main points there:

First, Egypt officially declared that the Palestinian Liberation Organization does not represent the Palestinians living in Jordan, thus stripping Yassir Arafat of his claim to be sole representative of the “whole Palestinian people.”

Second, Egypt dropped its opposition to an Israeli-Jordanian disengagement arrangement.

Immediately afterwards both President Sadat and King Hussein took two practical steps: on July 23, Sadat presented Arafat a clear-cut ultimatum to start a dialogue with Jordan over the question of Palestinian participation in the Geneva Peace Conference. At the same time, Jordan, backed by Egypt, demanded a postponement of the all-Arab summit conference, scheduled for Sept. 3, in Morocco.

PLO REJECTS SADAT-HUSSEIN FORMULA

The outcome was an uproar. The PLO strongly rejected the new formula signed by Sadat and Hussein, accusing Egypt of “plotting against the unity, legitimate rights and self-determination” of the Palestinians. Several top leaders of the PLO bluntly refused the Egyptian dictate to make peace with the Hashemite monarch, threatening to fight back with Soviet aid and by enlisting support from other Arab states.

The PLO refusal threw the delicate inter-Arab balance into turmoil. Gradually it turned out that Syria, Kuwait, Tunisia and others were taking negative attitudes to the Sadat-Hussein agreement (backed by the Saudis). Syria refrained from direct attacks on Egypt’s moves to cut the wings of the PLO. But President Assad of Syria took the lead in rejecting the demand for the postponement of the Morocco summit. This was not a mere technical point, but a very important part of the Egyptian plan. Sadat wants to complete a Jordanian-Palestinian compromise before the summit. If a summit convenes before such compromise is reached, it will mean an open split or even a breakdown of his plan, because such a summit may easily be called to reaffirm the resolutions taken in November, 1973, at the Algiers summit, to the effect that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinians, including those living under Hussein’s rule.

SYRIANS BASE PLANS ON NEW WAR

The controversy over the status of the PLO and Hussein with respect to the problem of Palestinian representation no doubt goes much deeper than that. The Syrians, for example, are opting for a new war in the near future. They realize that they would not be able to get further concessions from Israel on the Golan Heights. Therefore they seek methods to detonate the negotiations process with the other Arab states. Their support of the PLO is one such method. Their reliance upon Soviet military aid — unlike Egypt — is another. Syria’s airforce has grown bigger than that of Egypt throughout the last few months.

The rivalry between the Egyptian-Jordanian-Saudi camps and the Syrian-PLO-Kuwait ones is, of course, shaped along other lines as well: how to exploit the “oil weapon”, what should the Arabs do with their enormous sums of dollars? the relationship with the super powers, etc.

However, there seems to be an understanding not to let this conflict develop beyond a certain limit. Diplomatic and to some extent also propaganda confrontation is acceptable. Direct political clash to the verge of another inter-Arab cold war is generally regarded as a common nightmare.

EFFORTS SEEN FOR COMPROMISE

This is why one cannot consider the present groupings and realignments as frozen or drifting apart. On the contrary: In spite of the differences and the formation of informal blocs, efforts are already underway to limit the scope of the controversy and seek, once again, “a solidarity of position” through negotiations and the ordinary play of give and take.

Is Sadat the one who is going to do the “taking” or will he be compelled this time to make some “giving”? If he “takes”, it means a Jordanian triumph over the PLO. If he “gives” the victory will be Arafat’s.

Israel watches this complicated game at close hand. But watching is certainly not enough. That is why the government announced on July 21 its readiness to start peace talks with Jordan and reaffirmed its refusal to sit with the PLO. This declaration naturally added some strength to the Sadat-Hussein agreement, but it could not decide the outcome of the inter-Arab haggling, now approaching its climax.