Behind the Headlines Sadat’s Lost Opportunity

When Joseph Sisco was the State Department’s Middle East expert before becoming American University’s president last summer, he was fond of saying that the Arab-Israeli conflict was a history of “lost opportunities.” The latest of the losers appears to be Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In his three-day Washington visit, with the world media focused on him, political analysts saw him fumbling the finest chance of his long campaign to win over America by being a champion of a just Middle East peace.

Instead, analysts indicated, he chose to be a partisan advocate of his own country and his immediate interests without perceptible movement towards that full settlement of which he himself spoke of but failed to implement. The best pro-Egyptian American officials could say of Sadat’s visit was that they were satisfied with the tone of his detailed talks with President Carter and would have “concepts and suggestions” to consider with his advisors in Cairo.

U.S. officials conceded that Sadat’s visit did not move closer either the procedure for a conference or the substance for a settlement. In his approaches. Carter was negative to the continuing Arab conditions of Israeli withdrawals from post-1967 territories, a Palestinian state and recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization before the Arab countries would go into a conference and allow Israel to exist, not as an equal neighbor but as a ghetto.

Carter’s friendliness toward Sadat implied assurance of continuing economic support but little encouragement on the arms he sought. The impression is that Carter is deferring these decisions until after he hears the views of the leaders of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and, especially and above all, Saudi Arabia over the next eight weeks.

A RAGGED FINISH

Analysts who saw Sadat’s first brush with the Israeli press here during his press conference at Blair House Wednesday thought he finished looking ragged. He failed to satisfy those who looked for meaty responses to reporters’ questions of why he “accepts” Israel “now” and what caused his change in “attitude” to speak of “normalization” with Israel.

His response was that when he accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and made his “peace speech” Feb. 4, 1971, it denoted his acceptance of Israel. This, however, was greeted with doubt in view of the fact that since then Egypt staged the Yom Kippur War, pushed anti-Zionism and the Arab boycott wherever possible and assailed Israel in the UN, UNESCO and other public forums.

The thinking here is that Sadat’s statements accepting Israel and normalizing relations was designed to please the White House and Congress to obtain the economic and military assistance he needs to keep the lid on the unrest in Egypt. The Soviet threat from Africa against Egypt, which Sadat referred to, was described by one Israeli journalist as “a transparent red herring made of clear plastic.”

Another Israeli journalist found a different loophole in Sadat’s campaign to seduce Washington. Since Sadat “accepta” Israel, he asked, why not exchange Israeli and Egyptian journalists. The Egyptian leader’s response was negative and blamed his people who, he said, are not ready for that. This led some reporters to note that his government is too weak for even such a minor shift in Egypt’s attitude. If that is the case, it was ventured, how can Sadat make the necessary concessions for an agreement in Geneva?

MODERATION NOT APPARENT

For years, Sadat has been progressively cultivated and publicized by the Western media and political leaders since he is regarded as the key to “moderation” towards a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But Sadat was disappointing in his “moderation.” He talked of the “end of the state of belligerence” and not of the peace Carter had outlined. He asked for U.S. “pressure” on Israel to let the PLO into the political process and urged the U.S. to open a “dialogue” with the PLO. But he made no gesture of cordiality like assurances of an end to political terrorism, the harboring of terrorists and the propaganda and economic warfare.

Sadat spoke of solidarity and advancement among the African Arab nations last month while everybody who heard him knew they also had attacked Israel, upheld the PLO even while that terrorist group continues to demand the dismantling of Israel.

Nevertheless, faith continues that Sadat may still prove to be the principal Arab political figure capable of constructing a Mideast peace. He is still President of 40 million people in the key area of the world’s crossroads. All can be forgiven, analysts said, if Sadat on his return to Cairo can reflect on his lost opportunity and take steps, tiny as they must be at first, that can lead to an improved climate at least between Egypt and Israel. Perhaps, some noted, he is waiting to see what other Arabs tell Carter before he edges closer towards “moderation.”