Let’s Do Business with the Kremlin

Somehow the notion is gaining hold that if Israel would only agree to withdraw to her pre-1967 borders, the threat of Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East would recede, the U.S. would be spared from worry over a further naval thrust into the Mediterranean, and Israel would benefit from a benign Kremlin. Whether in tones of friendly persuasion or of dire warning, the sweep of expression is the same — altenation of American public opinion from continued unwavering support of Israel’s logically incontestible insistence on a negotiated settlement with the Arabs before withdrawal. Thus, the word is spread by one pair of syndicated columnists that “pro-Western Arab leaders” are saying privately that if Israel does not soon agree to withdraw from the Sinai, the Egyptian government “niay come under the eventual political control of Moscow as the price for continued Soviet aid.” The ### they report, would include a Soviet naval base on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. The ugly inforence is that if this happens, Israel will be responsible for Soviet extension of power in the Levant.

The State Department scoffs at these views. This being budget season in Washington, a high Department source observed, a Soviet naval scare would help the Navy convince Congress of its requirements for hardware and funds. Besides, he added, if the Israelis did leave the Sinai who would push the Russians out of Egypt? One New York Kremlinologist says this is the “critical period of decision-making” in the Kremlin in preparation for the fist Communist Party Congress since 1966 on March 30. Therefore, “a reluctant White House is being urged by the State Department, CIA and outside Soviet analysts — including some in the Soviet Embassy to send a new signal to the Moscow summit to influence a decision there on Russia’s national priorities in the 1970s. “If the Soviet Union misreads American policy toward the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Soviet-German detente, stability in the Mideast and peace in Southeast Asia, hard “line elements in the Politburo could be strengthened,” the Kremlinologist warned For evidence, he noted that the Soviet “official press reflects a trent towards tightening up in ideology and discipline, a trend evidently favored by the party machine and military leaders.”

BETTER THE DEVIL WE KNOW THAN THE ONE WE DON’T KNOW

Even in this topsy-turvy world, it appears strange that Party Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin would look for help from old Communist-hunter Nixon and the CIA to save them from the clutches of the Red Army. What this does seem to mean is “Let’s do business with the Kremlin’s present leaders, tough as they are; if we don’t, they will fall, and those who will take over from them will be awfully worse.” Again, a State Department source looked askance at this view. “This sort of propaganda,” he remarked, “has been coming out of the Kremlin since the rise of Stalin In those days it wasn’t Stalin who was so bad; it was those people around him. The Kremlin people always say ‘work with us; it will be much tougher with the next lot.” All this is not to say that firm understandings should not be sought with the Soviets and peace restored and maintained. But must Israel be the victim of the accommodations between the superpowers? Must the friends of Israel pipe down on their support of that little country because the Kremlin leaders face internal competition?

If the Kremlin is indeed serious for “real peace” it could demonstrate its earnestness by toning down its rhetoric in the United Nations about Israel and in its propaganda around the world about “Zionist hooligans,” and it could allow Jews who wish to leave Russia to emigrate. Closer perhaps to a correct assessment of the Kremlin’s intention is Washington State Sen. Henry M. Jackson’s most recent view. He said that “between the desire to avert war and the desire for peace there is an enormous range of Soviet policy objectives.” The Soviets are “determined to gain control over the oil supplies on which our Western European and Japanese allies are totally dependent,” so “the unhappy truth is that the Soviets, far from urging the radical Arab states to make peace with Israel, are determined to keep tension high and to nurture the distant hope that Israel will one day be destroyed.” The Washington Senator may be right. Anyway, 86 Senators and an overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives thought he was last December when Congress approved his support-for-Israel policy, which the President subsequently signed into law.