On the Eve of Rabin’s U.S. Visit: Sense of Uncertainty Clouds Mideast Situation and Bilateral Relati

The Cabinet held its political debate on foreign policy and defense today on the eve of Premier Yitzhak Rabin’s departure for the United States. The Premier’s visit beginning tomorrow–his third since taking office and the second to be officially designated a State visit–has been described here and in Washington as an attempt to develop a common U.S.-Israeli strategy in pursuit of a Middle East peace settlement and to renew the momentum of negotiations.

What emerged from today’s Cabinet session was the sense of uncertainty that clouds the Middle East situation and bilateral relations between Israel and the U.S. The situation in Lebanon, where a Syrian-sponsored cease-fire went into effect yesterday, is unclear and there is mounting concern here that events in Lebanon will hereafter be controlled by the Syrians with the balance of power in that country shifting from moderates to extremist supporters of the PLO.

The outcome of the Security Council’s Mideast debate is also unclear. The Council is expected to vote tomorrow on a resolution which, though modified somewhat from the original hard-line Arab draft, nevertheless would enhance the position of the PLO and support its political aims.

DISAPPOINTED WITH U.S. CUTS

Relations with Washington are also under a cloud. Israeli circles are reportedly disappointed by the news that the Ford Administration will request $500 million less in aid for Israel next year. (See JTA Daily News Bulletin Jan. 22.) A certain tension has arisen over reports that even State Department officials in Washington were surprised that the Administration’s aid cut plans were leaked at a time when the Administration is taking pains to develop a comfortable atmosphere for Rabin’s visit.

Officials here believe Washington’s main concern is to get through 1976 without a new Middle East war. The U.S., therefore, wants “momentum” in negotiations because it believes that stagnation can only lead to war. One of the conundrums that Rabin will have to solve in his talks with President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is how to generate momentum in a situation that has changed substantially since the second Israeli-Egyptian interim accord was signed last September.

PROBLEMS WITH ISRAEL’S NEIGHBORS

Officials here see no chance of interim talks with Syria since that country continues to pursue a hard line which so far has advanced President Hafez Assad’s political stature in the Arab world as champion of the Palestinian cause. Although implementation of the Sinai accord with Egypt is proceeding smoothly, there is no question of initiating a further step-by-step process with Cairo. The U.S. and Israel in fact agreed in their September Memorandum that the next stage of negotiations with Egypt must be for a final peace settlement.

This leaves Jordan as the only front where a negotiating “momentum” might be developed. Officials here have shown a renewed interest of late in “the Jordanian option” and say the U.S. is also interested in exploring the possibility that Jordan can reinstate itself as a negotiating partner on behalf of the West Bank Arabs. Since the October 1974 Arab summit meeting at Rabat established the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian Arabs, Jordan has taken a back seat and has acquiesced, at least in public, to the PLO’s role.

The U.S., as is well known here, held and still holds Israel responsible for failing to negotiate an interim pact with King Hussein before the Rabat meeting which might have headed off the PLO resolution.

Some officials here, however, detect signs that Hussein may be trying to find a way back to the center of negotiations. He has announced that he will convene his parliament in March with the participation, for the first time, of its West Bank members. There will be municipal elections on the West Bank in April–held under Israeli aegis, but according to Jordanian law–which could become a showdown between PLO sympathizers and more moderate forces who remain loyal to Hussein or favor a non-PLO Indigenous representation of West Bank interests.

Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, who visited Washington earlier this month, is understood to have tentatively raised his latest ideas for informal talks between Israel and Jordan with the participation of non-PLO West Bank leaders. According to Allon, U.S. officials seemed interested in his ideas. What remains unclear and indeed doubtful is whether Rabin can make an attractive and authoritative proposal to the Americans for transmission to Amman, that might induce Hussein to risk the anger of Arab hardliners in the hope of regaining part of the West Bank in an interim settlement.

TALKS WITH JORDAN TO BE RAISED

Rabin, however, would also be taking a political risk at least equal to Hussein’s Israeli proposals involving withdrawal from any part of the West Bank are certain to create a furore in Rabin’s coalition government and possibly lead to its downfall. Theoretically, the government has the right to negotiate with Jordan but it is obliged to call for a national referendum before it can actually sign a West Bank settlement.

Many observers here believe the Rabin government is too weak to negotiate with Hussein. Some say Ford and Kissinger are aware of the Premier’s internal difficulties and will not press him for any definitive proposals on Jordan at this time but would seek instead a broad, general statement of Israel’s willingness to consider interim talks with Jordan.

It is unclear, however, how such a general statement would generate the negotiating momentum desired by Washington. Another option is the Geneva conference. In a speech to the United Israel Appeal-Keren Hayesod mission here last night, the Premier called for reconvening the Geneva talks under the terms of reference of the original letter of invitation of December 1973. He is expected to reiterate this in his public appearances in the U.S. But with Syria insisting on PLO participation at Geneva from the outset and Jordan insisting–at least publicly–that it does not speak for the Palestinians, it is difficult to see how the conference could be reconvened.