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U.S. Said to Favor 4 Power Talks As Means of Uncovering ‘soft Spots’ in Israeli Policy

March 27, 1969
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A main United States objective in the coming Four Power talks on Mideast peace is the uncovering of possible “soft spots” in the public position of Israel on minimum peace conditions and ascertaining of the extent of Jerusalem’s flexibility and compromise, it was learned today. Washington also believes that substantive discussions at the United Nations are desirable in order to try to elicit the amount of “give” in the Arab stand.

American policy-makers are not convinced that Israel is firmly wedded to its stated public policy of insistence on a total peace settlement as a condition of withdrawing its forces from occupied territories. The Big Power talks, involving the U.S., Russia, France and Britain, are seen as a means of creating an international climate conducive to a settlement in the troubled region although officials here insist that final decisions would be left to the parties directly concerned.

A more detailed definition of the main U.S. objectives in the Four Power talks is emerging here. Among U.S. aims are the avoidance of a nuclear confrontation with Russia; improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations in order to improve circumstances for a Vietnam peace and to facilitate Washington-Moscow missile talks; preservation of pro-Western Arab regimes such as Jordan which is now threatened by Palestinian extremists; reduction of tensions that facilitate further Soviet penetration of the Mideast; and strengthening of the Jarring mission as an instrument for a settlement.

Some emphasis in current thinking is being put on possible solution of the Arab refugee issue prior to a general settlement in hopes that it would facilitate a settlement. The U.S. considers that a main stumbling block to peace is the refugee problem but has until now believed that it could be resolved only in the context of an overall settlement; a new line of thought however is that the overall settlement depends upon a prior refugee solution.

The current assessment of the Soviet position on the Mideast by U.S. officials is that Moscow wishes genuinely to avoid a confrontation with the U.S. there. Since the Russians are willing to talk about the Mideast in the Four Power context, the U.S. feels that it is in the U.S. national security interest to pursue the talks. Among the indications of apparent sincere Soviet interest in de-escalating tensions in the Mideast being cited by officials are: Soviet-Chinese difficulties, the desire of the Russian public for a better life, Russian assistance to the U.S. in promoting Vietnam peace talks, and the general willingness of Moscow to discuss outstanding problems between the two superpowers.

Policy-makers maintain that there has been no shift in basic American policy on the Mideast since the election. Washington authorities acknowledge the existence of a Russian proposal for a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal as a first step toward a general peace settlement. But the U.S. was said to be insisting on a total package and reportedly has no intention of separating the canal from other issues. In explaining their emphasis on the Big Four talks, officials insist that the very process of diplomatic activity is an important deterrent to conflict affecting all parties in the area.

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