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White Paper Remains Revisionists Say: Prime Ministep’s Letter Interpreting White Paper Disappointing

February 19, 1931
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The Prime Minister’s letter explaining and interpreting the White Paper of October 1930 is regarded by us as disappointing and highly prejudicial to the future of Zionism, says a statement issued to-day by the Executive Committee of the World Union of Zionist-Revisionists at a Press Conference presided over by Mr. M. Grossman.

While removing some most objectionable passages from the White Paper, the statement proceeds, the Prime Minister’s letter does not satisfy Jewish claims and grievances with regard to British policy in Palestine. It leaves the political situation unaltered, but tends to mislead the Jewish public and arouse unjustified optimism.

The letter by the Prime Minister should be considered in the light of the answers given to the questions raised in the House of Commons on February 11th. These clearly show that the British Government was unwilling to give to the letter the same “status as the dominating document” – the White Paper of October 1930. Though this impression was somewhat modified on the following day, it nevertheless remained clear that the White Paper was to be the dominating document and the letter to Dr. Weizmann was only to serve as “the authoritative interpretation of the White Paper on the matters with which the letter deals.”

The letter leaves no room for doubt that all the negotiations between the representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Committee of the Cabinet, have proceeded on the basis of the White Paper of 1930, despite the fact that the Actions Committee and the united voice of Jewry, have, from the very commencement, denounced any negotiations on that basis. Further, the letter implies that the Jewish Agency by having accepted the White Paper of 1922 is now bound by the White Paper of 1930 which refers to and endorses the White Paper of 1922.

TWO STATEMENTS – WHITE PAPER AND INTERPRETATION – WILL NOW STRUGGLE FOR AUTHORITY VARIOUS PARAGRAPHS FORMING BATTLEFIELD OF POLEMIC WHICH WILL NOT FACILITATE UNDERSTANDING

There have now been set up two statements: the White Paper of October 1930, and the letter by the Prime Minister. Each will, within a few weeks struggle for authority, and the various sentences and paragraphs of these documents will form a battlefield of polemic which will certainly not facilitate the “understanding” for which the Prime Minister so earnestly presses in his letter. The Prime Minister’s reference to his speech in the House of Commons expressing the intention of the Government to continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the Mandate is surprising, in view of the fact that his “very plain statement”, as he calls it, was followed by a series of official enquiries reports and statements of policy, each raising new complications and modifying in each case the significance of his speech.

No land enquiry is of any value or can be expected to yield any profitable result, unless the extensive sparsely populated territory of Transjordan is to be included within its scope, the statement continues with references to the announcement made in the Premier’s letter of the institution of a new Government enquiry “as soon as possible” to ascertain what State and other land can be made available for close settlement by Jews under Article 6 of the Mandate. This must be received with caution, having in view the number of Government enquiries and statements on the question of land, each of them officially reinforcing the previous one to the effect that there was practically no land available for Jewish settlement. The omission of Transjordan from the Prime Minister’s letter, it is added, takes from that document any value which it might otherwise have had, so far as land adjustment is concerned.

The letter presents no fundamental improvement in conditions of immigration. It does not touch the wider problem of a Jewish mass immigration, without which the Jewish National Home can be given no reality. The Government insists upon retaining complete control of immigration. It will also, in issuing immigration certificates, take into account the state of unemployment among Arabs as among Jews. This latter leaves unaltered paragraphs 27 and 28 of the White Paper, described by Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon (letter in Times” November 3rd.), as one of the several departures from the obligations of the Mandate embodied in the White Paper.

Important issues raised by the White Paper, such as the proposed establishment of a Legislative Council, the status of the Jewish Agency, and the creation of a Development Fund, are not even referred to in the Prime Minister’s letter. They must therefore be presumed to retain the spirit and intention given them by the White Paper, without any re-interpretation. Nevertheless, the letter of the Prime Minister endeavours to create the impression that the conflict with the Jewish Agency which the omission of these main issues is bound to produce, has been resolved to the general satisfaction. The Legislative Council foreshadowed in the White Paper has been bitterly opposed by Jews throughout the world, who regard any such body as an Arab instrument which will, in a phrase frequently used by members of the Permanent Mandates Commission, make impossible the establishment of a Jewish National Home. So long as the policy of the Legislative Council stands, a policy which is bound to undermine all Jewish work in Palestine – any assurances embodied in the letter must be regarded as of no value.

Attention is drawn to the passage in the letter, in which the Prime Minister declares that the full solution of the problem of policy depends on an understanding between the Jews and the Arabs, and proceeds to say that “until that is reached, considerations of balance must inevitably enter into the definition of policy”. This passage repeats, in a sense, the objectionable passage in the White Paper which strove to cast upon the Jewish Agency the duty of effecting an understanding with the Arabs. It lays down the inacceptable principle that, until an understanding with the Arabs is reached, the British Government will continue its policy of passivity, and not turn towards that “active policy” which the Mandates Commission repeatedly declared to be the duty of the Government. In effect, the Arabs are thus informed that they are, by refusing an understanding, in a position to make impossible the introduction of an “active policy”. This passage in the letter must be regarded as nullifying the passage in the same letter which admits active facilitation of the Jewish National Home as “a positive obligation” of the British Government.

On receipt of the Prime Minister’s letter, Dr. Weizmann found it necessary to issue a public statement which has created the impression that the negotiations have concluded satisfactorily, and that there is now no reason why the work in Palestine should not proceed smoothly. The letter is addressed to “Dr. Weizmann, President of the Jewish Agency”, though he has resigned from that position and himself declares in his statement: “I can speak in my personal capacity only”.

It should be the first duty of the Jewish public to make clear that Dr. Weizmann’s Statement in no way represents Jewish feeling or Jewish opinion; that the Prime Minister’s letter cannot be regarded as satisfactory, inasmuch as it does not overthrow the White Paper of October 1930 to which Jewry took such solid objection.

The letter by the Prime Minister is but the first stage of the negotiations. It is to be followed by the framing of administrative and legislative measures which are to govern the development of Palestine and the Jewish National Home. In these circumstances Dr. Weizmann’s endorsement of the Prime Minister’s letter, must be regarded as prejudicial to any further negotiations which Jewry may, in the future, in one form or another, carry on with the British Government.

To the second part of the negotiations, the Revisionist statement concludes, the Jewish public must adopt a determined and unequivocal attitude. These negotiations must not be continued by the present leadership. Congress must first of all be convened and Jewry must not be confronted with an arrangement which it will be compelled to repudiate, thus creating a painful situation which will prejudice the work of the future representatives of the Jewish Agency.

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