Will Rogers’ Mideast Trip Be More Productive Than Jarring Mission?

An American cartoon shows Secretary of State William P. Rogers in Arab garb astride a camel Passing a skeleton in the desert and near it a diplomat’s briefcase marked “Gunnar V. Jarring.” The cartoon is captioned, “Rogers of Arabia.” It is too soon to say whether the cartoon’s implications are accurate, but observers here are talking about them. That Ambassador Jarring’s mission has collapsod, if not ended, seems obvious from the fact that it was Rogers, not Jarring, who went to the Middle East despite assurances from Washington that his mission was still alive. Dr. Jarring returned to his ambassadorial post in Moscow when the interim Suez Canal idea surfaced in the wake of Israel’s refusal to withdraw to its old frontiers. There is a suspicion that UN Secretary General U Thant’s rush to Europe to meet with his special Mideast mediator a for Rogers’ travel plans became known, was to keep Dr. Jarring from resigning at an embarrassing time. Why Rogers decided to risk having his political bones bleached on the Middle East sands at this time is not yet clear to those who watch the scene. Rogers himself said that President Nixon asked him to make the trip and exchange ideas with the hope of achieving progress towards an interim settlement although not as much as a “breakthrough.” But was that all he went for? It is granted that Secretaries of State have usually attended CENTO meetings and it would have been strange for Rogers to have gone to Ankara and not to have visited capitals a little further south

Rather the visit, given all the complexities that have baffled diplomats for two decades had motives for State Department strategists other than to talk about the Suez Canal. The Department is not short of facts on the canal or views from any of the concerned governments. More basic was that Rogers was staking his personal prestige in seeking to reestablish strong credibility for the United States with Arab leaders and to tell them how far the U.S. was willing to go to end an increasingly vexing situation that included both Israel’s security and Soviet ambitions. Just how far the U.S. was willing to go would depend on Arab concessions beyond simple recognition of Israel which could be violated just as the cease-fire standstill was violated. Although the U.S. is Israel’s only major ally. Rogers appeared to be trying to mount offensives on two fronts. First, he seemed to wish to assure the Arabs that the U.S. is still their friend and that, under slightly ameliorated circumstances, he would go to Israel as a friendly mediator, a sort of “neutral” for the Arabs. In Israel, it looked like he was copying the style of certain top Israeli officials on their trips to Washington – visit with Israeli leaders who might influence Premier Golda Meir to soften her position. Rogers’ itinerary by itself seemed to communicate that element in the planning of the trip. Less apparent were other aspects, some admittedly speculative. No Secretary of State could visit the Middle East without personally speaking with the King of Saudi Arabia. Even President Roosevelt, sick as he was in 1945, went from Yalta to meet with the kings of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan aboard a ship in the Suez.

Arab Oil, Tito’s Expertise. Sadat’s Hope For U.S. Aid Part Of Mideast Politics

After all, the U.S. draws $500 million annually from Saudi Arabia’s oil. Also, it was just possible that having invited King Faisal to visit Nixon at an as yet unspecified date, the monarch might listen to American suggestions on how to persuade Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat to be less agreeable to the Russians. Sadat might be persuaded, since the king gives him about $250 million a year to cover Egypt’s loss because the canal is closed. For the Cairo visit, some items seemed apparent. Would Cairo substitute “police” for “troops” on the east side of the canal as a condition for its reopening? Would Cairo allow “use” of land in the Sinai to move Israel away from its “acquisition?” These modifications would help the Secretary of State in the inevitable confrontation with Israel on his “formula” of “insubstantial” border changes. But observers thought that Rogers had additional things in mind. What, for instance, would Egypt require from the U.S. in return for the resumption of diplomatic relations and the trade that would follow from that act of international normalcy, not to mention development by American companies of Egyptian oil fields? And how far is Cairo thinking of allowing the Soviet Union to build up its strength on the Nile and extend its influence over the Egyptian regime? An intriguing question raised in Washington was whether Tito, in his recent visit to Cairo, suggested some ways on how to treat the Soviets. No authority in Europe is more subtle in the international game than the ageless Yugoslavian President.

Tito shot down American planes but was able to extract “foreign aid” after turning against Stalin. When Khruschev came to power. Tito maneuvered both the Kremlin and the White House into giving assistance to Yugoslavia but without becoming the “client” of either. Sadat could learn a few things from Tito who pushed Israel aside to become Arabs’ friend. Perhaps that is why Sadat fired Egyptian Vice-President Aly Sabry, the Kremlin’s best friend in Cairo. Was it to show the Soviets who is boss in Egypt and, thereby, please the Americans too on the eve of Rogers’ visit, and get rid of a personal rival all at one time? Egypt needs economic help. If Russia will not provide adequate aid. America might. This formula worked for Tito for years. Why not for Sadat? But the complexity of international politics goes far beyond stratagems like that. Rogers must wonder what the Arabs will really demand for an American-controlled force to stay in Sharm el-Sheikh and dominate Soviet shipping through the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean with easy access to the oil riches of the Persian Gulf. And then, how much can a Secretary of State promise the Arabs on the Israeli question after what both Republican and Democratic leaders on Capitol Hill said in support of Israel just as he was about to visit the Arab governments? The Secretary of State must consider, as he comes homeward, what he can now recommend practically to the President. Even the best pundits shy away from that. But the hints will be coming soon.