Allon, in His Talk with Kissinger, to Raise Possibility of Further Israeli Pull-back if Egypt Promis

Foreign Minister Yigal Allon will raise the possibility of a further Israeli pull-back of up to 50 kilometers in the Sinai in return for commensurate political concessions from Egypt when he meets tomorrow with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in Washington.

Alternatively, he will offer a more modest Israeli withdrawal for less significant concession from Egypt. But Israel will insist that there must be quid pro quo if any further agreements are to be reached with Cairo and rules out any “linkage” of a second stage disengagement in Sinai to additional Israeli withdrawals on the Golan Heights to satisfy Syria. informed sources said today.

Allon left for the U.S. last night after delaying his departure 24 hours because of the flu. (The Israeli diplomat arrived this afternoon in Washington. See separate story.)

Sources here said there have been no indications from Washington that Kissinger will try to persuade Israel to link a Sinai arrangement with a new “token” disengagement with Syria. If the Secretary broaches the subject, Allon would say he is not authorized to state a position and would cable home for instructions, the sources said.

Allon, himself, suggested last week that if he and Kissinger reached a stage in their talks that required a firm and authoritative Israeli decision, he would cable home and the Cabinet would convene in a special session to decide.

SEVERAL POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Observers said that Allon’s aim is to present several possible scenarios that Israel could contemplate and elicit from the Secretary an idea of Egyptian thinking. Officials here say they do not know yet if Allon will be followed to Washington by Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy. or if Washington’s contacts with Egypt will proceed on a lower level. Nor can they say yet if Kissinger himself will visit the Middle East before Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev visits the region next month.

The 50-kilometer withdrawal scenario would involve the tremendously expensive process of building a new defense line in Sinai east of the key Mitle Pass which Israel would vacate. All vacated areas would have to be demilitarized and put under UN control The accord would have to state specifically that the arrangements would remain in effect for a substantial period to be negotiated, possibly several years. Egypt would announce its intention to reopen the Suez Canal in connection with the accord with Israel, though not immediately for Israeli ships.

The deep withdrawal and new wide buffer zone, coupled with the canal opening, would be regarded by Israel as a decisive step towards the pacification of the area, observers here believe.

A second Israeli proposal involves a more modest pullback. leaving Israel in control of the Mitle Pass. Premier Yitzhak Rabin, in his Haaretz interview last week, said Israel would insist on retaining the pass, and some observers here feel he has envisaged this more modest scenario for a settlement.

RABIN’S ‘CONCESSIONS’ CRITICIZED

The interview has been criticized in both opposition and government circles for its frankness and its “concessions.” But sources close to the Premier said he did not regret giving it. His intention, they said, was “to create an atmosphere of negotiations” in advance of the new round of

NON-BELLIGERENCY DEMAND WAS NON-PRODUCTIVE

The Premier’s “concessions” and his readiness to consider a “military” accord rather than a “political” one, and his failure to insist on a declarative renunciation of belligerence by Egypt were less momentous than his critics imply, observers said. It has been clear here for months that the initial Israeli demand for a formal renunciation of belligerence by Egypt in a second-stage partial settlement was non-productive.

Many officials in Jerusalem have always doubted the notion. Kissinger himself told both Rabin and Allon that while Egypt might possibly agree to aspects of a “political” pact. it could not afford to agree to formally renouncing the state of belligerence while Israel still occupied its land. Israel was also cautioned against labeling the agreement as “political” when the Rabat summit banned separate political progress with Israel by any Arab state.

Though Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz in Washington was forced to deny in October that he had spoken favorably of “de facto non-belligerency,” Rabin told the Knesset a month later that what mattered was the content of an agreement, not its legal-diplomatic label. “If we can agree on the content, we shall have no difficulty over the nomenclature,” Rabin told the House then. in what shrewd observers at the time saw as a retreat from his earlier demands for formal “non-belligerence” and a specifically “political” settlement.