Behind the Headlines the Dilemma of the Labor Alignment

The Labor Alignment currently faces a severe problem: is it ready to challenge the government’s policy regarding the peace negotiations by presenting to the public a clearly different set of alternative views? For the present, the Alignment seems reluctant to advocate such a fundamentally different approach, thus, in effect, confirming the government’s contention that there is a basic national consensus with regards to Israel’s minimal conditions for peace.

The Alignment’s confusion has been accentuated since the Leeds Castle conference in mid-July, where Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan announced Israel’s readiness to discuss a territorial compromise over the West Bank. Until Leeds the Alignment had accused the government of missing the change for peace by refusing to suggest to Egypt that territorial compromise might be the basis for a solution to the problem of the West Bank’s status.

In the ancient castle of Leeds, Dayan dared to mention that solution, asking the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Kaamel whether his country would agree to consider it. Kaamel outrightly rejected the proposal, stressing Egypt’s formal and oft-stated position that none of the occupied territories are subject to negotiation: they must be returned in toto.

Dayan returned home, informed Premier Menachem Begin of Kaamel’s negative reaction and planned the next step: a public announcement of the government’s readiness to discuss a territorial compromise over Judea and Samaria. In a TV interview, Begin hastened to announce the Egyptian refusal, preparing the country for an official statement made by Dayan in the Knesset the next day.

On the basis of the Egyptian refusal–already known to the Cabinet, but not to the public–Dayan could easily declare Israel’s consent to discuss a territorial compromise. Kaamel’s rejection of the offer enabled Begin to respond smilingly to a TV interviewer’s question as to whether the Likud government was genuinely prepared to contemplate territorial concessions on the West Bank–part of historic Eretz Israel.

A POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC GAMBIT

Dayan’s statement that Israel is ready to hold serious talks about a territorial compromise is interpreted by official circles here as a genuine effort to find new channels of negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Were Kaamel to have responded positively, Israel would indeed have sincerely begun negotiating this possibility, the circles claim.

Some, however, are wondering whether Dayan’s move was in fact planned on the assumption of a negative response by Egypt–and that its main objective was to convince Israeli public opinion that the option of a territorial compromise does not really exist.

In fact, Dayan’s offer, paradoxically, prompted Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to harden his position by declaring that he would not resume negotiations unless Israel declared it would withdraw from territories occupied in the Six-Day War. It took President Carter’s summit plan for Camp David next month to shift Sadat from this new obdurateness.

NEED TO REALIGN ALIGNMENT’S POSITION

Whatever its motive, Dayan’s maneuver at Leeds Castle compells the Alignment to reconsider its positions with regard to the negotiations. Until now the Alignment claimed in effect that if the government claimed in effect that if the government were to suggest a territorial compromise an agreement could be reached. The fact is, however, that Egypt rejected any idea of such a solution. This was Egypt’s formal position at Leeds–in spite of earlier informal indications of flexibility.

In order now to challenge the government’s policy, the Labor Alignment must decide whether it would accept Sadat’s conditions which included: total withdrawal from territories occupied in the Six-Day War; a removal of all Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and Sinai Peninsula; and the establishment of security measures such as international-manned electronic warning stations and demilitarized zones.

Only by agreeing to such conditions will the Alignment truly represent a significant different view than that now advanced by the government itself, because by advocating its present views (territorial compromise, the existence of Jewish settlements in selected parts of the administered areas, and so on), the Alignment does not differ substantially, fundamentally, from the government’s policy as enunciated by Dayan, and consequently does not fulfil its role as the main opposition party.

For the time being, the Alignment seems to favor the government’s view rather than that of Sadat. In doing so, it appears to confirm, perhaps unwittingly, certainly unwillingly, the existence of a “national consensus,” as Begin has claimed since he came to power.