The death of Yuri Andropov and the accession of Konstantin Chemenko as the top leader of the Soviet Communist Party is unlikely to bring any basic change for the immediate future in policy toward the Soviet Jewish community.
During the course of the past year, it is now clear, basic Communist Party decisions have been largely taken by the Politburo as a collective group and it is more than likely that the forthcoming transitional period will also be marked by the collectivity of decision-making. Each key member of the Politburo represents a crucial and major interest group in Soviet society.
Caution in terms of decision-making and, especially in terms of changes in the existing policy line with respect to most areas is certain to be the prevailing mode. This flows from the collective character of decision-making, the predominantly gerontological feature of the leadership, and the fact that, in the current state of American-Soviet sharp tensions, no one will be inclined to seek a hasty and significant modification of the Party line.
Moreover, it is probable that the entire Party leadership of the Politburo, given its awareness of Andropov’s long and terminal illness, carefully considered and very likely planned all possible steps to take account of a variety of changing circumstances. While clashing interests and struggles for power were undoubtedly occurring, they were carefully shielded from public view.
PARTY POLICY REGARDING SOVIET JEWRY
With reference to Soviet Jewry, Party policy as elaborated by the collective leadership under Andropov and, no doubt to be continued for the time being, under Chemenko, the new General Secretary, comprises four areas:
* A veritable shut-down on emigration but with a trickle allowed exodus. The trickle serves a variety of purposes. It is a “demonstration” that the USSR is adhering to the Helsinki accord. It is also a convenient lever to use against refuseniks: “be quiet, and, in due course, you too can emigrate.”
* An intensifying clampdown on the study of Hebrew and Jewish, history by “ulpanim” or other private and informal means. This is accompanied by modest, largely inconsequential gestures suggesting concessions with respect, to culture in Yiddish.
* A serious effort to limit and restrict, although not totally sever, the contacts and relationship between Soviet Jews and Jews of the West. This is being accompanied by an effort, unprecedented in the last several decades, to laud in the press persons with obviously Jewish names who have served “patriotically” or otherwise the Soviet cause.
* A broadening. “anti-Zionist” media campaign with distinctive, though at times blurred, features of anti-Jewish stereo-typing and bigotry. The campaign has been institutionalized, provided official sanction, and given extensive local casting with the creation of the “Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public.”
To the extent that the official Soviet policy toward Soviet Jewry is largely a function of the relationship between the USSR and the West, mainly the U.S., with the Jews held, as if were, as hostages to that relationship, no significant alleviation of the Soviet Jewish plight can be expected in the near future. No serious experts on Soviet affairs anticipate any immediate thawing in the current Frigidity of the U.S.-USSR relationships.
Still, the new Soviet leader, beyond the immediate transitional stage, may seek to provide his Administration with a more popular base by initiating “peace” gestures or responding to “peace” gestures from the West. Such gestures of responses would evoke strong positive reactions within the Soviet public (and elsewhere).
Under circumstances of a renewed, even if limited, dialogue with the West, particularly in the area of arms (especially nuclear arms) control, an improvement in the condition of Soviet Jewry, most notably with respect to emigration, should and would not be excluded.
In this respect, Chemenko’s most recent statement on East-West relations, which appears in an introduction to a newly-published translation of his speeches and articles, is encouraging. He wrote that “we are in favor of active and fruitful dialogue with nations living under different social systems than ours, the United States and Britain in particular.” Chemenko added that it was “more important than ever” to intensify efforts for mutual understanding with the U.S.
CHEMENKO’S VIEWS ON EMIGRATION
Of the entire 12-man top Soviet leadership, only Chemenko, the 73-year-old former principal aide to Leonid Brezhnev, has expressed himself publicly on the subject of emigration. For a time, submerged by Andropov, he re-couped much of his powers with the worsening illness of the former and now enjoys eminence as the dominant “Old Guard” figure. Thus, his views have considerable pertinence.
These can be gleaned from an excerpt from Chemenko’s book, “Human Rights in Soviet Society,” published in 1981 by Novosti:
“As for emigration, the relevant Soviet legislation and rules are fully in accord with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which says, among other things, that the right to go abroad may be limited in certain cases where it is necessary ‘to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedom of others.’ In some cases, the permission to emigrate may be postponed until the applicant’s close relatives have settled their affairs, including material matters.
“A decision on the application for permission to emigrate may be postponed in the case of persons possessing state secrets or those who have recently undergone training in important military fields. Upon the expiration of the established time limit for secrecy, the application for emigration is reconsidered. We have no other causes for not allowing emigration.”
AVOIDS A TOTALLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE
While narrow and restrictive in its interpretation of international human rights and law, it nonetheless, on an overall basis, avoids a totally negative response to the issue of emigration rights. Even as Brezhnev took special pride in the Helsinki Final Act without, however, giving any focus to its “reunion of families” features, so, too, can it be expected that Chemenko, like his late protector, and unlike Andropov, will give at least lip service to the Helsinki accord. Indeed, in the above-mentioned work, Chemenko makes favorable reference to Helsinki.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
