The Russians are going. Sadat has spoken, Golda Meir has spoken and still it would be a rash man who claimed to know exactly what has taken place this last fortnight, or who sought to predict the future with any degree of certainty. Mrs. Meir herself said in the Knesset Wednesday “It is still premature to make a reliable evaluation of the reasons, scope and result of this decision taken by the Egyptian government.”
Just as the Israel government still feels itself, to some extent, in the dark and not for the want of assiduous watching and listening, so the US too has not yet arrived at a final evaluation of the Soviet pullout and its possible repercussions. Washington has already had to retreat from Defense Secretary Laird’s assessment last week that only 5000 Russian servicemen would be involved in the withdrawal. A greater number have already left and more are still leaving.
The hasty and ignominious Soviet withdrawal, on President Sadat’s embarrassingly peremptory orders, will surely not be the end of the episode. Many experienced political observers stressed as noteworthy Moscow’s ominous silence following Sadat’s sudden public ouster of the Russian advisors and experts. Only several days after the Egyptian President’s announcement did the official Soviet news media record briefly that the advisors were returning home from Egypt on the conclusion of their assignments. There was no response in the Soviet press to Sadat’s accusations that the Russians had failed him; no counter-charges, no retorts in kind.
Veteran Russia-watchers say this initial silence bodes a massive retaliation in the future; a planned retaliation, calculated to hurt Sadat more than any immediate exchange of angry rhetoric could do. It is when the slight sustained is considered truly damaging that the Kremlin does not respond at once, but plans its reaction long and carefully, and the expulsion from Egypt was damaging indeed to Russian prestige–damage far greater than any benefit in savings of cash and equipment, the experts say.
On the other hand, the experts could be wrong: The Soviets may decide to forego a vengeful reaction against Sadat in the interests of their wider strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Whatever the Soviet’s intentions, the US is hardly likely to attempt to exploit their discomfiture in Egypt, at least not in the near future. Even those factions within American politics who would like to see the country’s ties with the Arab world mended–the oil lobby and the State Department Arabists–are reportedly counseling caution and circumspection in any fence-mending attempts with Egypt. There have been reports this week that the US and Iraq have agreed to station diplomats in each other’s capitals–a step towards restoring the full diplomatic relations severed in 1967. The reports say a similar agreement will soon be reached with Syria. This, of course, is directly related to the weakening of Soviet influence in the Arab world. But a detente with Egypt would be a much slower process.
Officials in Jerusalem are not expecting any US diplomatic activity vis-a-vis Egypt at least until after the Presidential elections in Nov. And even then, it is said here hopefully, the administration will not want to step into Egypt diplomatically or physically if this would mean angering the Russians and prejudicing the chances of an overall East-West detente which were raised by the Moscow summit.
Whatever the final ramifications of the Soviet ouster, Israel already sees the event as important, even perhaps historic in the context of the Middle East. This view permeated Premier Meir’s speech, and it gave urgency and timeliness to what was after all only her restatement of Israel’s constant readiness for direct negotiations towards a full or partial (canal) settlement. What was perhaps new in her address was its conciliatory tone and its scrupulous care to address the Egyptian leader as an equal worthy of respect.
Israel does not anticipate a positive response from Sadat today or tomorrow to Mrs. Meir’s call for face-to-face talks. Officials here explain that the aim was to set before the Egyptian leadership at this time, which could be a watershed in Mideast history, the Israeli people’s deep desire for peace and the Israel government’s ideas at to how to go about obtaining it. Western commentators had said that with the Egyptian ouster of the Russians, the ball was in Israel’s court: Mrs. Meir’s aim was to send it back to Egypt’s court.
Egypt herself, it is all too apparent, has not yet formulated her policies for the future, perhaps because she too does not yet know what the eventual Russian reaction will be to her assertion of independence. This weekend President Sadat will visit Libya, probably to investigate that oil-rich country’s readiness to offer him support in lieu of the Soviet’s. But recent events in Libya have cast doubts on the solidity of the regime there, and Libyan offers and promises, as Uganda’s President Idi Amin is now learning, do not always materialize. Libya, furthermore, is only rich in money. It has neither the planes nor the rockets nor the spare parts, the supply of which Sadat must ensure.
France too would be incapable of filling the military supply gap if the Russians cut off their hardware. Only the two superpowers can keep a war machine of the Egyptian dimensions operational, and this is the measure of Mr. Sadat’s dilemma.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
