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Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Chasidic School District Case

The Supreme Court heard arguments this week in a case involving a special New York school district for handicapped Chasidic children that tests the limits of church-state relations. Lawyers for New York state and the Satmar Chasidim argued before a packed courtroom Wednesday that the school district was a constitutionally permissible way for the state […]

March 31, 1994
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The Supreme Court heard arguments this week in a case involving a special New York school district for handicapped Chasidic children that tests the limits of church-state relations.

Lawyers for New York state and the Satmar Chasidim argued before a packed courtroom Wednesday that the school district was a constitutionally permissible way for the state to accommodate the needs of a particular religious community.

But Jay Worona, the attorney for two taxpayers who sued to close the district, said that by creating a public school to service the needs of one religious group, the state had created a “religiously segregated environment” that violated the constitutional separation of church and state.

The New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, ruled last July that the district was indeed unconstitutional and ordered the school closed.

“The New York court has said that these people, because they are religious, cannot be trusted to run a public school,” said Nathan Lewin, a Washington lawyer who represented the school district.

Formed by the New York State Legislature in 1989, the school district provides services to some 220 emotionally and physically disabled children in the Orange County village of Kiryas Joel, where most of the residents are Satmar Chasidim.

It was created in response to complaints by Chasidic parents that they could not send their handicapped children to area yeshivot because of inadequate facilities, and they could not send them to nearby public schools for the handicapped due to religious and cultural differences with the other students.

Lewin argued that the district — and the village itself — are not exclusive of other religions or beliefs. “Anyone can own property there,” he said.

O’CONNOR ASKS IF IT’S DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

He also said the state was not taking part in the teaching of religious doctrine. The subject matter taught at the school is entirely secular.

Julie Mereson, an assistant attorney general from New York, argued that the state had not authorized a religious group to run the district.

“The power (to run the school district) was not transferred to any religious organization but to the residents of the community,” she said.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor challenged the district’s attorneys, asking if there was “a dangerous precedent here” in the state legislature’s creating a school district for a particular group.

Arguing against the district, Worona said the legislature formed the district considering only the legislature formed the district considering only the religious beliefs of the village’s residents.

Justice Antonin Scalia responded by questioning the legislature’s exact motives.

“Certainly the district is culturally segregated and linguistically segregated, but is it religiously segregated?” he asked. “You could say that the district was drawn (to include only) those who speak Yiddish.”

The case, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel vs. Grumet, has made headlines as the major church-state case of this Supreme Court term.

Its popularity was evidenced by the number of observers who crowded into the courtroom, including several Chasidim who were forced to remove their hats once inside.

Jewish groups have been vocal but divided over the case. Many got involved by filing friend-of-the-court briefs with the justices.

Orthodox groups, including Agudath Israel of America, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America and the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, support the school district as a necessary source of services to which the handicapped children are entitled.

In its brief, Agudath Israel argued against closing the school district, which would amount to “the refusal of local governmental entities adequately to accommodate” religious communities.

But mainstream Jewish organizations applauded the New York court’s rejection of the district, which was consistent with their view that government should be neutral on religion.

Rabbi David Saperstein, director of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, said the government cannot create a school district with the idea of isolating one group of people.

“There are many school districts in the United States with primarily white students,” he said. But “government can’t create a single one with the intention of having it be white.”

CASE COULD ALTER LEGAL DOCTRINE

The American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Anti-Defamation League, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, National Council of Jewish Women, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations all filed briefs against the school district.

All interested parties, however, were watching for the Supreme Court’s treatment of a longestablished but controversial legal doctrine, which some experts say could be changed with this case.

That doctrine, known as the “Lemon test” after a 1971 case, has been used by courts to determine to what extent state governments can accommodate religious practices without violating the Constitution.

The test says a government action dealing with religion must have a secular purpose; its effect must neither enhance nor inhibit religion; and it must not involve excessive government entanglement with religion.

This test, formulated in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, has long been criticized as vague, difficult to apply and inconsistent in its results. But most Jewish groups have supported it as vital protection from government interference.

The New York court based its decision to close the district on the doctrine.

Some justices have indicated in previous cases that a new test should be adopted, and experts agreed that this could be the case in which the standard is changed.

But supporters of the so-called “Lemon test” were encouraged because none of the justices mentioned possible alternatives.

But while Saperstein found this encouraging,

Lewin acknowledged that the justices could still decide to adopt a new standard in this case.

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