Jews of each land to their own Government, asking this Government to use its influence at Geneva in order to support our demands. A fourth is a petition to each Government asking it to use its influence at Geneva in order to make Great Britain give up the Mandate.
I need not go into a detailed discussion of the advisability of any petition at all, and if a petition is advisable, which form to choose. I would merely say two things. The first is that any such action undertaken by anybody but the officially accredited representatives of the Jewish Agency is unthinkable and cannot be tolerated. Any section of the Organization doing this is placing itself outside the pale of the Zionist Organization.
I have never been inclined to get very excited over what the Revisionists call their “separate political work”; I know that it is more talk about work than actual work. Yet I must say that such interference with our difficult political task as would be represented by a Petition organized by the Revisionists must be prevented. Secondly, I would say that we must beware of the fallacy of believing that Great Britain may consent to be pushed by violent methods.
We have been attacked for not doing anything positive in connection with the problem of the Palestine Arabs. No doubt Dr. Arlosoroff will have something to say about this matter; but I must say for myself that many Zionists have no very clear notions of what they conceive to be the task of the Executive in this respect. Are we to make peace with the Arabs by talking to them diplomatically. If so, what are we to offer? I can understand the attitude of some members of the Brith Shalom. They say frankly: If we want to establish an understanding with the Arabs, then we must offer them something tangible in return for their recognition of our right of entry into Palestine, and, say they, the only thing we can offer Arabs is their political liberty, namely, parliamentary Government. I say that I can understand this point of view although I do not share it.
The way to an understanding with the Arabs of Palestine is not a very obvious one, but certain important avenues do exist and some progress has been made along them during the past year. The first is that Jews and Arabs should co-operate on public bodies, Government committees, etc. I think there is more of this going on than people are aware of, and the policy of the Palestine Government seems to be to develop this process. The second avenue is that of Government firmness in its policy. Any vacilation on the part of the Mandatory Power is interpreted by the Arabs as weakness and an encouragement to their extremists. Conditions in this respect are not always satisfactory, and it is part of the task of the Executive to urge upon the Government at all times a steady firmness in its policy. Thirdly there is the undoubted fact that our work in Palestine is bringing great benefit to the Arabs; that our national interest is indeed also the interest of the Arabs.
I object to such talk as that we are going to Palestine for the benefit of everybody. Nobody believes it, and in any case, we refuse to allow the Arabs or anybody else the right to decide whether we may or may not come to Palestine. But we must use facts and figures to prove that our benefit is compatible with that of the Arabs, and must desist from any talk or act that may lead to misunderstanding.
What has made the problem of the Palestine Arabs so difficult, Dr. Brodetsky said, is the smoke screen that has been thrown up around the whole question, consisting of allegation based upon anti-Jewish prejudice: the allegation that while the Jewish National Home may be an excellent objective considered theoretically, it simply can not be carried into effect; that the very existence of the Arabs of Palestine is threatened by our work. The Shaw Commission was led astray by this allegation. The representatives of the Mandatory Power, the then Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, and the then High Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, were predisposed to this view, put up an appearance of scientific neutrality, and said that this must be carefully investigated. The result was the Hope Simpson Report and the accompanying White Paper which foreshadowed severe restrictions upon Jewish land acquisition and Jewish immigration.
A careful study of the Prime Minister’s letter will show that in principle the restrictions adumbrated in the White Paper were largely annulled as the result of the discussion with the Cabinet Sub-Committee.
The Archive of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency includes articles published from 1923 to 2008. Archive stories reflect the journalistic standards and practices of the time they were published.
